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	<title>Comments on: A Tale of Two Captains, Part Two</title>
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	<description>Website of author and historian, Steven Pressfield.</description>
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		<title>By: Robert Paterson</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-2/#comment-1743</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert Paterson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2009 14:41:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1743</guid>
		<description>I spent 3 years in Saudi Arabia in the late 70&#039;s as the Kingdom was making the surface shift to the modern world. More than half of Ryadh was still made of mud. Jedda was as if in a time machine.

My Bible was Lawrence and Bell. I spoke no Arabic, but worked hard on the lessons of this being a formal society where men spoke to men.

For my first year, I would show up at the mazlis of the big men and just sit and drink coffee. Because I showed up often and behaved (kept my mouth shut until spoken to) after a while, I would be asked questions. Usually about things that I had no knowledge of. I was being tested for being a caring person. Over time, I would move up the side of the group and get closer to the man. More often I would be asked my opinion. I knew I was &quot;In&quot; when the Coffee men would give me a smile of recognition.

I had a great boss - an English aristocrat - who understood all of this implicitly - his core advice was to listen for the &quot;Test&quot;. He told me that at some point I would be given a hint of a desire - not for a bribe but to tell me about something that meant a lot to the &quot;man&quot;. The unaware or the inattentive would miss it - it would be subtle.

It was the next summer, Wimbledon was in full swing. My client and I were chatting about tennis. He had been educated in England and sounded more English than I did. Then it came. He said how sad he was that it was so hard to get tickets for centre court.  It was just a passing thought in a long conversation and was not spoken as a question or a request.

I sense that this was it, the test, but had no idea of what to do. So I asked Chris. He laughed and went over to the trading desk - &quot;Rob&quot; he said &quot;Centre Court Tickets are traded on the LSE&quot; I go back onto the line with Hisham and told him that he could buy a pair of tickets for this price - he said yes immediately.

This was my &quot;shotgun&quot; moment. It was not even a &quot;gift&quot; - it was an act of paying attention. Of showing that I cared.

As a consequence, I too was adopted, I was in my late 20&#039;s by one of the leading Jedda families, the Alireza&#039;s and this tribal connection became my safety net and my entree.

Consequently I had a very different experience in the Kingdom than most of my competitors. Not only did I build a great business there, but I felt as if I was going home whenever I arrived there. I lived in the local world rather than the bubble. The irony would be when I took down senior partners of my firm to the country. All the attention would be paid to me - after all who were these men whom they did not know.

I miss it very much.

I think that your idea of senior officers staying out in Afghanistan for maybe 10 -15 years is essential. You surely have to know and love the country that you are tasked to work in.  Not just at the senior level as I found out. Would it be impossible for a young American man to make his career the connector? It took me less than 2 years to gain the trust and I did not speak Arabic. 3-5 years as a Captain or WO spread all over the country would anchor the mission - there would always be a hand over and a legacy.

Thank you Mr Pressfield - for all your books and insight and for this forum</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I spent 3 years in Saudi Arabia in the late 70&#8217;s as the Kingdom was making the surface shift to the modern world. More than half of Ryadh was still made of mud. Jedda was as if in a time machine.</p>
<p>My Bible was Lawrence and Bell. I spoke no Arabic, but worked hard on the lessons of this being a formal society where men spoke to men.</p>
<p>For my first year, I would show up at the mazlis of the big men and just sit and drink coffee. Because I showed up often and behaved (kept my mouth shut until spoken to) after a while, I would be asked questions. Usually about things that I had no knowledge of. I was being tested for being a caring person. Over time, I would move up the side of the group and get closer to the man. More often I would be asked my opinion. I knew I was &#8220;In&#8221; when the Coffee men would give me a smile of recognition.</p>
<p>I had a great boss &#8211; an English aristocrat &#8211; who understood all of this implicitly &#8211; his core advice was to listen for the &#8220;Test&#8221;. He told me that at some point I would be given a hint of a desire &#8211; not for a bribe but to tell me about something that meant a lot to the &#8220;man&#8221;. The unaware or the inattentive would miss it &#8211; it would be subtle.</p>
<p>It was the next summer, Wimbledon was in full swing. My client and I were chatting about tennis. He had been educated in England and sounded more English than I did. Then it came. He said how sad he was that it was so hard to get tickets for centre court.  It was just a passing thought in a long conversation and was not spoken as a question or a request.</p>
<p>I sense that this was it, the test, but had no idea of what to do. So I asked Chris. He laughed and went over to the trading desk &#8211; &#8220;Rob&#8221; he said &#8220;Centre Court Tickets are traded on the LSE&#8221; I go back onto the line with Hisham and told him that he could buy a pair of tickets for this price &#8211; he said yes immediately.</p>
<p>This was my &#8220;shotgun&#8221; moment. It was not even a &#8220;gift&#8221; &#8211; it was an act of paying attention. Of showing that I cared.</p>
<p>As a consequence, I too was adopted, I was in my late 20&#8217;s by one of the leading Jedda families, the Alireza&#8217;s and this tribal connection became my safety net and my entree.</p>
<p>Consequently I had a very different experience in the Kingdom than most of my competitors. Not only did I build a great business there, but I felt as if I was going home whenever I arrived there. I lived in the local world rather than the bubble. The irony would be when I took down senior partners of my firm to the country. All the attention would be paid to me &#8211; after all who were these men whom they did not know.</p>
<p>I miss it very much.</p>
<p>I think that your idea of senior officers staying out in Afghanistan for maybe 10 -15 years is essential. You surely have to know and love the country that you are tasked to work in.  Not just at the senior level as I found out. Would it be impossible for a young American man to make his career the connector? It took me less than 2 years to gain the trust and I did not speak Arabic. 3-5 years as a Captain or WO spread all over the country would anchor the mission &#8211; there would always be a hand over and a legacy.</p>
<p>Thank you Mr Pressfield &#8211; for all your books and insight and for this forum</p>
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		<title>By: COL RK Stagner</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-2/#comment-1742</link>
		<dc:creator>COL RK Stagner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2009 14:00:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1742</guid>
		<description>Nice, but nothing new.  The best work in Afghanistan was done early by properly trained and educated Special Operations Forces (beards and all).  In both Iraq and Afghanistan, we send troops trained to break things--a necessary skill in winning conventional wars--into COIN situations and tell them to figure it out of the ground.  Want to win in Afghanistan?  Put US SOF in charge of operations with coalition SOF and conventional troops in support.  They should work hand-in-glove with CIA, Dept of State, USAID and, most importantly, the Afghan government under a clear strategy (and authority) from the President.  Sounds simple, but we continue to get it wrong.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nice, but nothing new.  The best work in Afghanistan was done early by properly trained and educated Special Operations Forces (beards and all).  In both Iraq and Afghanistan, we send troops trained to break things&#8211;a necessary skill in winning conventional wars&#8211;into COIN situations and tell them to figure it out of the ground.  Want to win in Afghanistan?  Put US SOF in charge of operations with coalition SOF and conventional troops in support.  They should work hand-in-glove with CIA, Dept of State, USAID and, most importantly, the Afghan government under a clear strategy (and authority) from the President.  Sounds simple, but we continue to get it wrong.</p>
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		<title>By: Wolfy</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-2/#comment-1741</link>
		<dc:creator>Wolfy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2009 20:31:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1741</guid>
		<description>Really enjoyed your videos, very graphic but accurate portrayals of a war that can&#039;t be won. The Soviets sent in their army and Spetsnaz special forces, fought the Taliban for 10 years, and still couldn&#039;t beat the Taliban. Of course, our CIA was kind enough to train and equip this army of fanatics who now are fighting US. Who exactly at the CIA was in charge of this fiasco?

Now, we are asking the US Marines to drive the Taliban out. But, strangely, Obama has asked these Jarheads not to fire in civilian areas. Wow, if I was a Taliban leader, I sure would want to hide out and place my mortars, snipers, and rocket launchers in a civilian village. And, the Marines are in the valleys and the enemy has the high ground. Gosh, another cluster f..k!

I spent 20 years as an officer in Naval Intelligence, two tours in Viet Nam in combat gathering tactical intel, mission planning, and catching and interrogating Congs and NVA soldiers.  Afganistan will be another Nam as Obama and his merry men are clueless when it comes to fighting a war.  The enemy will wait us out since Muslims, while terrible regular soliders, make great guerilla fighters and have lots of patience.  After we leave Iraq, Iran will invite itself in to maintain security and the UN won&#039;t say squat.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Really enjoyed your videos, very graphic but accurate portrayals of a war that can&#8217;t be won. The Soviets sent in their army and Spetsnaz special forces, fought the Taliban for 10 years, and still couldn&#8217;t beat the Taliban. Of course, our CIA was kind enough to train and equip this army of fanatics who now are fighting US. Who exactly at the CIA was in charge of this fiasco?</p>
<p>Now, we are asking the US Marines to drive the Taliban out. But, strangely, Obama has asked these Jarheads not to fire in civilian areas. Wow, if I was a Taliban leader, I sure would want to hide out and place my mortars, snipers, and rocket launchers in a civilian village. And, the Marines are in the valleys and the enemy has the high ground. Gosh, another cluster f..k!</p>
<p>I spent 20 years as an officer in Naval Intelligence, two tours in Viet Nam in combat gathering tactical intel, mission planning, and catching and interrogating Congs and NVA soldiers.  Afganistan will be another Nam as Obama and his merry men are clueless when it comes to fighting a war.  The enemy will wait us out since Muslims, while terrible regular soliders, make great guerilla fighters and have lots of patience.  After we leave Iraq, Iran will invite itself in to maintain security and the UN won&#8217;t say squat.</p>
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		<title>By: Patrick Lowthian</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-2/#comment-1740</link>
		<dc:creator>Patrick Lowthian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2009 13:37:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1740</guid>
		<description>Mr. Pressfield,
I&#039;m an Army Chaplain in an SF unit. Heading to Afghanistan in the future (won&#039;t say when), so I&#039;m glad to keep up with your site as mission preparation. Have read Killing Rommel (and recommended it to many) and Gates of Fire. Heard you on Hugh Hewitt as well--which lead me to Killing Rommel. Thanks for your work.
Chaplain Lowthian</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Pressfield,<br />
I&#8217;m an Army Chaplain in an SF unit. Heading to Afghanistan in the future (won&#8217;t say when), so I&#8217;m glad to keep up with your site as mission preparation. Have read Killing Rommel (and recommended it to many) and Gates of Fire. Heard you on Hugh Hewitt as well&#8211;which lead me to Killing Rommel. Thanks for your work.<br />
Chaplain Lowthian</p>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-2/#comment-1739</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2009 21:33:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1739</guid>
		<description>I don&#039;t know the two gentlemen in question but it is likely that if they are exceptional in the above role they were exceptional in what they did before that. Fortunately a keen personnel manager did not lock them into logistics when they were outstanding XOs and S4s, or into training when they excelled as cadre or OCs. The system benefits from fortuitous accidents, and the equally likely mistakes are inevitably rectified.

Yes. The current system is frustrating. The critique of the personnel system creating generalists rather than experts is true. The advantages of enhanced continuity are obvious.

But... you cannot optimize for everything.  I doubt it was by design but the current system does avoid the long term institutional sclerosis, empire building and turf wars that plague organizations where roles and responsibilities are endlessly refined and narrowed.  The current system does create adaptable leaders—ones who won&#039;t be obsessed with re-fighting the last war—at the cost of waste and friction. All systems, human or mechanical, require its designers to trade various efficiencies. I think our system today is pretty close to right. There is probably room for more commander flexibility in a time of war. Technology, properly applied (today it is not) can definitely ameliorate the worst outcomes.  Those are improvements around the edges. I would love to hear of an alternative that does not require its implementors (the actual personnel decision makers) to possess above average capabilities.

No, I do not think the system achieves optimal results, but I think it may avoid the worst.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t know the two gentlemen in question but it is likely that if they are exceptional in the above role they were exceptional in what they did before that. Fortunately a keen personnel manager did not lock them into logistics when they were outstanding XOs and S4s, or into training when they excelled as cadre or OCs. The system benefits from fortuitous accidents, and the equally likely mistakes are inevitably rectified.</p>
<p>Yes. The current system is frustrating. The critique of the personnel system creating generalists rather than experts is true. The advantages of enhanced continuity are obvious.</p>
<p>But&#8230; you cannot optimize for everything.  I doubt it was by design but the current system does avoid the long term institutional sclerosis, empire building and turf wars that plague organizations where roles and responsibilities are endlessly refined and narrowed.  The current system does create adaptable leaders—ones who won&#8217;t be obsessed with re-fighting the last war—at the cost of waste and friction. All systems, human or mechanical, require its designers to trade various efficiencies. I think our system today is pretty close to right. There is probably room for more commander flexibility in a time of war. Technology, properly applied (today it is not) can definitely ameliorate the worst outcomes.  Those are improvements around the edges. I would love to hear of an alternative that does not require its implementors (the actual personnel decision makers) to possess above average capabilities.</p>
<p>No, I do not think the system achieves optimal results, but I think it may avoid the worst.</p>
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		<title>By: Jack Holt</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-2/#comment-1738</link>
		<dc:creator>Jack Holt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2009 12:37:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1738</guid>
		<description>Steven,

Great stuff. My experience was as a Marine platoon commander in Somalia and our CO worked against the tactical thinking by cleaning up streets, scrounging lumber from the UN compound to give away to our AO, etc. It paid enormous dividends.

Hadn&#039;t thought about the personnel/career path problem in this light but also see the benefits of longevity. Transfers to the business world, too, and I&#039;ll now keep that better in mind with my people (www.S3.com).

Thanks, I&#039;ll keep reading. Jack</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steven,</p>
<p>Great stuff. My experience was as a Marine platoon commander in Somalia and our CO worked against the tactical thinking by cleaning up streets, scrounging lumber from the UN compound to give away to our AO, etc. It paid enormous dividends.</p>
<p>Hadn&#8217;t thought about the personnel/career path problem in this light but also see the benefits of longevity. Transfers to the business world, too, and I&#8217;ll now keep that better in mind with my people (www.S3.com).</p>
<p>Thanks, I&#8217;ll keep reading. Jack</p>
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		<title>By: Wolfgang Kupka</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-1/#comment-1737</link>
		<dc:creator>Wolfgang Kupka</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2009 20:59:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1737</guid>
		<description>Hello Steve, this is a great idea! It never sises to remind me of how little we learned from our past mistakes. I was in the Air Force during our Vietnam War. Politics and the will to win will always butt heads in the US. Some politicians couldn&#039;t wait to see us lose in Iraq and Vietnam. Along with changing our way of thinking on the battlefield, we need to do the same in Washington.
You have me hooked. Keep up the good work.

Regards
Wolf</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Steve, this is a great idea! It never sises to remind me of how little we learned from our past mistakes. I was in the Air Force during our Vietnam War. Politics and the will to win will always butt heads in the US. Some politicians couldn&#8217;t wait to see us lose in Iraq and Vietnam. Along with changing our way of thinking on the battlefield, we need to do the same in Washington.<br />
You have me hooked. Keep up the good work.</p>
<p>Regards<br />
Wolf</p>
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		<title>By: Gordon Daugherty</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-1/#comment-1736</link>
		<dc:creator>Gordon Daugherty</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2009 16:07:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1736</guid>
		<description>Glad to learn of this blog; I&#039;ve enjoyed your books. Also glad you&#039;re a former Marine. Re learning/re-learning old lessons: The military politicians who get to the top of the defense establishment (to me, Colin Powell is a prime example) are all Big Picture Guys, Strategic Thinkers, able to marshall vast hoards of troops, equipment, and logistics over vast fields of endeavor. That&#039;s fine for the Fulda Gap, even the sands of Iraq maybe but not for this tribal stuff. And the tribal stuff is probably where we&#039;re going to be fighting for the next military generation. The writings of Chesty Puller about Haiti, the Combined Action Platoons in SVN--all forgotten until the next time.

But here&#039;s some hope: think of all the young Lts-Majors, Corporals-SSgts who are being raised up in this current environment. Some of them will become generals and SgtMajs and maybe then things will perk up. Also, Petraeus may have enough clout to drag certain like-minded people along with him.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Glad to learn of this blog; I&#8217;ve enjoyed your books. Also glad you&#8217;re a former Marine. Re learning/re-learning old lessons: The military politicians who get to the top of the defense establishment (to me, Colin Powell is a prime example) are all Big Picture Guys, Strategic Thinkers, able to marshall vast hoards of troops, equipment, and logistics over vast fields of endeavor. That&#8217;s fine for the Fulda Gap, even the sands of Iraq maybe but not for this tribal stuff. And the tribal stuff is probably where we&#8217;re going to be fighting for the next military generation. The writings of Chesty Puller about Haiti, the Combined Action Platoons in SVN&#8211;all forgotten until the next time.</p>
<p>But here&#8217;s some hope: think of all the young Lts-Majors, Corporals-SSgts who are being raised up in this current environment. Some of them will become generals and SgtMajs and maybe then things will perk up. Also, Petraeus may have enough clout to drag certain like-minded people along with him.</p>
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		<title>By: BackwardsBoy</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-1/#comment-1735</link>
		<dc:creator>BackwardsBoy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2009 15:50:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1735</guid>
		<description>Congratulations on your blog, Steven. Instapundit has you linked, so gird yourself for an &quot;Instalanche&quot; of visits.
I greatly enjoyed &quot;Gates of Fire&quot;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Congratulations on your blog, Steven. Instapundit has you linked, so gird yourself for an &#8220;Instalanche&#8221; of visits.<br />
I greatly enjoyed &#8220;Gates of Fire&#8221;.</p>
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		<title>By: Douglas Marriott</title>
		<link>http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/07/a-tale-of-two-captains-part-two/comment-page-1/#comment-1734</link>
		<dc:creator>Douglas Marriott</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2009 15:43:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/?p=363#comment-1734</guid>
		<description>I have never served in the military, much to my regret in my twilight years, although both my brothers served in the South African Army during the Angola affair and one was killed there, so I have some empathy for the way the armed services work. Since retirement I have been drawn to study military systems as a prototype for civilian business practice. This is not the first time this has been done. Jack Welch at GE, for instance, valued the input of military officers in his management seminars (see his autobiography). My chosen field is engineering, and failure prevention in particular. This is what led me to examine management systems because, contrary to popular opinion, things don&#039;t break because the engineers fell down on the design, or because the operators were dumb, but because the system they were constrained to work in prevented them from doing the right thing! For confirmation just read the accounts of the two space shuttle disasters. Good, competent and dedicated people, who knew there was something wrong, were forcibly restrained from expressing views which ran counter to the prevailing doctrine. Do any of you veterans recognize anything here? My question is, given these same pressures, how does the military, generally speaking, succeed so well on the ground? Engineers seem to be unable to emulate, specifically, combat troops, in the latters&#039; ability to get the right thing done against the gradient set by people in galaxies far away. Fragging your boss is a great temptation, but probably not an option, no matter how attractive. Seriously, I welcome ideas on how competent civilian, mainly engineering work can be done, if necessary against the tide of managerial disapproval, by mimicking the military way.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have never served in the military, much to my regret in my twilight years, although both my brothers served in the South African Army during the Angola affair and one was killed there, so I have some empathy for the way the armed services work. Since retirement I have been drawn to study military systems as a prototype for civilian business practice. This is not the first time this has been done. Jack Welch at GE, for instance, valued the input of military officers in his management seminars (see his autobiography). My chosen field is engineering, and failure prevention in particular. This is what led me to examine management systems because, contrary to popular opinion, things don&#8217;t break because the engineers fell down on the design, or because the operators were dumb, but because the system they were constrained to work in prevented them from doing the right thing! For confirmation just read the accounts of the two space shuttle disasters. Good, competent and dedicated people, who knew there was something wrong, were forcibly restrained from expressing views which ran counter to the prevailing doctrine. Do any of you veterans recognize anything here? My question is, given these same pressures, how does the military, generally speaking, succeed so well on the ground? Engineers seem to be unable to emulate, specifically, combat troops, in the latters&#8217; ability to get the right thing done against the gradient set by people in galaxies far away. Fragging your boss is a great temptation, but probably not an option, no matter how attractive. Seriously, I welcome ideas on how competent civilian, mainly engineering work can be done, if necessary against the tide of managerial disapproval, by mimicking the military way.</p>
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