William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in various infantry and special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
ONE TRIBE AT A TIME
The “How” of Tribal Engagment
By Steven Pressfield | Published: October 19, 2009
[The blog is "on the road" this week, so I'm going to re-run last week's One Tribe At A Time post. I actually wanted to do this anyway, just because it produced so many interesting comments and questions. We'll have the full free downloadable .pdf of Maj. Jim Gant's One Tribe At A Time next Monday. Thanks, friends, for your patience! Now to business ...]
What would it take in cash and gear to put one U.S. Tribal Engagement Team to work with one Afghan tribe in one village? Here is Special Forces Major Jim Gant’s start-up shopping list:
Three to twelve [U.S.] men, based on the environment
2 interpreters
2 SAT phones
2 SATCOM radios (piggyback frequency)
2 PRC-119s
2 ATVs
2 Pickup trucks
3 Generators
2 Computers with a biometrics kit
Plus initial infill logistics package for the tribe:
100 AK-47s
30,000 to 50,000 rounds of ammunition
Assorted medical supplies
A ‘Gift of Honor’ for the tribal chief
Last week, we discussed the concept of the Tribal Engagement Team–a “small team of highly-trained and motivated men” who would live with, train, supply and fight alongside a Tribal Security Force, to provide security for its home village and district. Maj. Gant related how his own Special Forces ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) 316 had done just that in 2003 in Konar province–and that the effort, totally “home-grown” at the time, had succeeded beyond all expectation. The thesis of Maj. Gant’s paper is that such a strategy can work today throughout all Afghanistan.
Influence Without Authority. Maj. Gant with tribal leader Malik Noorafzhal.
My team ODA 316 and I created a model for successful tribal engagement and all that it requires. The relationships we developed not only worked while we were there, they have stood the test of time and continue to this day. I could re-insert a Tribal Engagement Team in Mangwel tomorrow. Given the time and resources, I would go anywhere in the country and do this.
Maj. Gant acknowledges that some districts are more “accessible” than others and that even in friendly villages, risk would be high and the Tribal Engagement Teams would be vulnerable and exposed.
Each TET tribe will become a target and they will take casualties. There will be fighting. But the fighting will be U.S. soldiers alongside tribesmen against a common enemy. Isn’t that what we want? There will [also] be push-back from assorted Afghan officials, power brokers, warlords, criminals. It will become a very personal fight. Once we commit to the tribe, the Pashtunwali code [honor, revenge, hospitality] comes into effect for the [U.S. teams] as well. In the end it will be the team’s ability to build a true bond with the tribe that is backed up by the warrior ethos: the ability and desire to fight and die alongside them when necessary.
What exactly would be each Tribal Engagement Team’s goals?
1. Establish and maintain rapport with the chosen tribe in the area. Advise and assist them in all matters.
2. Provide real security for the village. Not presence patrols, but 24/7 on-site security. A permanent presence that the tribes can rely on. “Advise, assist, train, equip and lead” a Tribal Security Force (TSF), an Arbakai.
3. Facilitate tactical civic action programs. Integration with the local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is crucial, along with the ability to use funds that units have at their disposal for “quick” money to help tribes who are facilitating the success of Coalition Forces and the Afghan government. Basic health care and services (water, power, irrigation), construction and repair of schools and clinics to improve the life of the tribe and employ the tribe as well. These programs would be worked through the local/district/provincial/national government when possible and be integrated into the U.S. battle space owner’s overall plan.
"ODA 316 built this well for Dr. Akhbar"
4. Employ an aggressive tactical PSYOP plan that ties into the overall strategic Information Operation campaign in the area. Tribes also can counter the extremely skillful Taliban propaganda. The world has to see Afghan tribes and U.S. soldiers working, living, laughing, fighting and dying together.
5. Report “Ground Truth” continuously. This activity will tie the tribe in with all the other levels of the government system. It would also be the process by which the tribe’s concerns would be fed directly to the Coalition Forces military apparatus. This would act as a check and balance for what is actually happening on the ground and what the GIRoA (Gov’t of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) may say is happening. “Ground Truth” provides feedback to headquarters level units in charge of the area ANA and ANP. They would then find solutions for everyday problems and political problems as well.
TET solutions should always be answers to local problems, yet always with an eye to integration with regional and national government representatives. It will also be imperative for TETs to watch for scenarios where local, district, provincial and national government forces can be successful. In other words, cooperate and help set the government up for success.
In return, the TSFs (Arbakais) and tribal members would provide security, intelligence and early warning of insurgent attacks to the U.S. teams, who would then pass this on to higher commands.
A properly executed Tribal Engagement strategy can be so effective that the Taliban feel threatened by our very presence, without us even firing a shot.
I asked Maj. Gant if there was an historical precedent for this? Has any Western force ever pulled off something like this before?
One of the main areas under contention today is in Southeast Afghanistan near Khas Khonar, Asadabad and the Pesch Valley areas. This is exactly where our team served. This same area was one of the British Empire’s most challenging territories. How did the English deal with it?
“From the 1890s to 1947, British control relied heavily on a small number of highly trained British officers. These frontier officers were highly educated, committed, conscientious, and hard working. Many had studied law and the history of the area and spoke some of the local languages. They had a deep sense of duty and a strong national identity. All required a depth of administrative competence and judgment to successfully wield the extensive powers at their disposal. They contributed significantly to the province’s security and stability. These men were particularly valuable in navigating the intricacies of tribal politics.” (To Create a Stable Afghanistan, Roe, p. 20, Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005)
Can Americans do this? Is our U.S. “high-and-tight” military mind-set capable of finding, training, funding and granting sufficient latitude and autonomy to such Tribal Engagement Teams?
The key to a successful tribal engagement strategy is the ability to identify individual officers and enlisted men who have a special gift for cross-cultural competency and building rapport—that is, they must become educated in the ways of the tribes and build strong relationships with them based on mutual trust and objectives. These men must like to fight and spend countless months, even years living in harsh circumstances. They will have to fully comprehend tribal concepts of honor, loyalty and revenge—the Pashtunwali code. Initially, they will have very little physical security other than the AK-47 they carry, their planning skills and the tribal fighters they live with.
A late-night meeting with Malik Noorafzhal and other elders
The situation will vary with each tribe, but it will always be complex and difficult. Each will present its unique spider web of loyalties and subtle agendas that a TET must deal with smartly and brutally when necessary. At the same time these men must be alert to detect and mediate local rivalries, sometimes within the tribe they are advising. They will have to be subjective on one issue and objective with another.
The American public is not known for being patient, particularly with a strategy that seems so innovative and unfamiliar. I asked Maj. Gant what he would say to this.
When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The Chinese bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider. But, on the fifth year the tree often grows more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to grow so much in year five.
Bottom line: A Tribal Engagement Strategy will have to be given time to do its work. But in the end, the result will be far-reaching and strategic in nature—a strong presence, firmly rooted, great in stature.
[We're hoping to have a free downloadable .pdf of the full text of One Tribe At A Time by next Monday. We'll set it up in this space if the schedule holds. Maj. Gant is at Fort Bliss, TX right now, preparing to deploy to Iraq. He'll be glad to respond to questions or comments, contingent of course upon time demands. Thanks to all for your terrific input and support!]
Once again excellent piece keep em coming…
Here’s a potentially ignorant question, but one that begs to be asked (by me, anyway):
Could ETTs include females?
This makes way too much sense. The bamboo tree analogy is spot on but the American people are too impatient to allow the TETs to establish those all-important roots. It seems we saw a similar reaction to the CORDS in Vietnam–results were not great enough, fast enough. Part of the strategy should, I think, include strategic communications with the American people in ways that use, but do not soley rely on, the national media. We have to teach and learn patience–a trait too many of us lack.
As a supporter of this effort, I perceive a shortcoming in this blog… Even though I’ve followed it since day one, I’m slowly losing track of the ultimate objective – not of the blog as it remains stated on page one – but of our intentions in Afghanistan. Having admitted that, if I hadn’t been following this since day one, I’d have difficulty understanding each weekly update and its relevance to the big picture. Case in point…
The first listed objective for the Tribal Engagement Team (TET) is to establish and maintain rapport with the chosen tribe in the area, and to advise and assist them in all matters. That’s fine and I understand the efficacy of the strategy, but in the big picture, how does success with that single TET objective promote the endgame. Even simpler: what is the endgame? Tribal rule? Democratic rule? Anything-but-Taliban rule? There is clearly a cost associated with this one-tribe-at-a-time strategy, and cost may be irrelevant IF the end game is relevant. I’ve lost sight of the endgame. Help. I’m sitting here contemplating the Dutch boy with his fingers in the dam. He’s got four fingers and a thumb and there are seven holes to plug. It’s a numbers game. The kid can’t grow more fingers, but he can enlist the aid of more of his buddies, and he can and will IF the endgame is relevant.
Over the years I’ve written several business plans and I structure each one this way: here’s where we’ve been; here’s where we are; here’s where we want to go; and here’s how were going to get there. Frankly, I no longer have a clear picture of where we want to go. If I’ve lost sight of that, I won’t know how we’re going to get there.
You and your guests have presented a lot of valuable and thought-provoking information on this blog. I apologize for being the caveman, but could you build a structured outline – just a simple one, bang, bang, bang – that I and others like me can refer to that would enable us to stay focused on where we’re going and how we’re going to get there. A possible summary page would help.
Respectfully,
Gene
Gene, that’s an excellent point. I hope to be addressing it further and in much more detail, in the Interview with A Tribal Chief post this Friday and following, with answers from Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai. In a nutshell, the end objective (it take cojones to make a statement like this regarding Afghanistan!) would, in my view, be some kind of hybrid, uniquely-Afghan form of governance, including for certain some kind of Loya Jirga-originated tribal confederacy–and probably other elements that don’t look a lot like Jeffersonian democracy, not to mention an international “fair broker” force to monitor and assist for some time to come. When the great Athenian Solon first established a new order in Athens, he made the people promise to adhere to his laws, no matter how much they disliked them, for ten years. (Meanwhile he took a trip around the world, meeting Croesus of Lydia among many other monarchs.) Solon knew that a new way would take time to find its feet. In AFG, ten years may be closer to a hundred. Anyway that’s my thinking: that from single tribes, providing their own security and governance in their own valley or district, a unity of tribes can be developed that could cover the entire country. In other words, a tribe-centric government, rather than the warlord-centric government we have right now.
P.S. Great question and answer re females on TETs!
Now this is making more sense to this caveman. A “tribe-centric” goverment, which has to be defined by the tribes and will not look like a Jeffersonian democracy. I’d suggest that Afghanistan existed for thousands of years under a “tribe-centric” government but that went to hell in a hand basket when the first invaders set foot on tribal soil. That was certainly the case when the Brits showed up.
QUESTION #1: Can a “tribe-centric” government exist and flourish in the context of today’s global environment?
Question #2: I posed this in response to Part 2 of the Chief Zazai post, Can a tribe or member of a tribe be Taliban? If an entire tribe can be Taliban, that becomes the toughest nut to crack.
I don’t have a lot to offer in the way of meaningful discussion this afternoon, but I wanted to express my thanks to Steve for hosting and contributing so much to this discussion, and to Maj. Gant for his time and effort, and his service. Good luck to you on your upcoming deployment, Major. It’s great to see a fellow NM’ican doing so much good.
Joanne – I’m not a subject matter expert, or even close, in this regard, but to my understanding, the Pashtun remain a male-dominated culture, with very traditional gender roles and expectations. This would lead me to say that involving women with the TET’s would, at the least, add more complications and greater headaches, which could take energy and time away from the overall mission. Again, not an SME, but I’d imagine that trying to integrate women into the TET would make an already difficult job, that much more so and potentially compromise success.
I could be entirely wrong, not having any experience with the culture, and will leave further comment to someone truly in the know.
Also (sorry, had a thought a’top a thought just as I hit the “post” button), given the mission of the TET, without even considering integrating a woman into the local culture, integrating her into the culture of the team might prove difficult.
The mission and necessary skillset of the TET suggests that the source of their members will be Special Forces, or other Special Operations Forces. That’s already a strictly male environment, and most of the men who serve with those organizations are quite content with that.
Females with the appropriate skillset (never mind the relevant experience, as I doubt greenhorns are part of the TET ideal) are in short supply, and if found, could face an uphill battle to simply be part of the team. A battle which could add stress and distraction to the team itself, without any benefit. Then there’s the whole issue of working under stress with someone of the opposite sex, and the typical psychology of male/female interactions. It adds up to layer upon layer of additional stress and distraction.
I won’t get into the argument of gender roles in combat – Even knowing that women can fight, and successfully, there remain strong arguments on both sides of that one, it gets emotional quick, and it’s really not the issue here. I think that in this instance it more comes down to value vs. cost and the potential costs of even trying to put a woman on a TET are very high, and offer little or no ROI.
Okay, back to reading now I promise.
Morgan,
I’m compelled to respond… my daughter is the head coach of the West Point women’s soccer team. One of her senior leaders is a young lady named Liz Betterbed. As Deputy Brigade Commander, Cadet Betterbed is the second highest ranking cadet at West Point this semester and has ranked #1 in her class academically since she arrived on the banks of the Hudson River four years ago. I’ve seen her on the soccer pitch and she is the consummate leader who leads by example. A real whirling dervish with purpose. I was fortunate to fly fighters in the U.S. Air Force back in the 1970’s. In combat, there are no lone wolves; we always flew with at least one other aircraft in formation and watched out for each other. Would I trust Liz Betterbed on my wing? In a heartbeat! I understand the gender difficulties in the Islamic world, but in combat… make no bones about it: West Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy are producting female officers without equal (and I’m ‘old school’ and initially resisted allowing women to attend the military academies). You can read more about Cadet Betterbed at
http://www.goarmysports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=48149&SPID=4608&DB_OEM_ID=11100&ATCLID=204808216
You’ll have to copy and paste that link, but it is definitely worth a look. These are the young people who will take up the fight wherever harm’s way leads them. Major Gant can rest assured that he will be joined by fearless fighters who practice what General MacArthur stated in 1946, “On the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other days and other fields will bear the fruits of victory.” I have faith in our future leaders.
Gene – Please don’t misunderstand. I personally have no problem with women in the military. In recent conflicts women have proven that they can play a valuable role as front line combat troops, and perform just as well as their male counterparts. Even in a direct action capacity, I have little objection to female Soldiers, Marines, Airmen or Sailors.
The only thing about women in the military I object to are the differing standards for men and women, and would like to see an objective/equal standard applied. We know there are women who can meet the male standard, and the Military remains a privilege not a right – Everyone should be held to the same standard, and those who don’t meet it can serve their community in another fashion. Librarian’s, EMT’s and Postal Workers are all valuable and noble professions (I’ve been two of the three).
I can understand the reservations about women in these roles, and there may be reasons for them not to be put in aggressive direct action units that have nothing to do with their ability to do the job – In no way do I think they can’t do the jobs they’re doing now. Being women has no bearing, either way, on being Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors or Marines.
That said – That’s all my personal argument and stance. This is an issue of strong opinions, and many people have differing ideas, and could take us off-topic very quickly. In this context, I think we can’t afford to indulge this, not in this discussion, nor in the application of the idea if/when it comes.
Full integration of women into the Military is a long ways off, and will probably not happen in Special Operations for some time. There will be many battles fought, internally, as that happens.
The TET’s, if they happened, would not be the place for that battle. Particularly given the poor suitability of women for engagement with typically male-dominated tribal societies. The ideal selection pool (as I’m seeing it) is made up of men exclusively. The other arguments, the resistance of the men in those pools, the difficulty of integrating a woman to their culture, etc. are just icing on the cake of those two things, in my opinion.
There are just too many reasons for that not to happen here. Somewhere else? Of course. We’ll get there eventually, but, here is not the time or place.
Ok- riddle me this… Have Gene and Morgan missed the last 8 years of two wars on two fronts? Females have been engaged in both wars …mmm..let’s see… the entire time! A CADET deputy brigade commander?? Really? How about, perhaps, making your point with someone who’s actually in the Army? Oh, I don’t know…like PFC Monica Brown, Silver Star Recipient who ran through gunfire to treat her wounded comrades? As for females on TETs?? We already have female engagement teams. The Marines have an all-female unit who’ve been working in the Now Zad Valley of Helmand Province going village to village to engage the women. It’s in the news..you just gotta read it. Hey Stevo- maybe you can showcase those Women Marines to show a two pronged approach in our quest to empower the tribes…
Giselle – Was typing my above reply to Gene when your comment came in, but I think some of it applies to your concerns as well.
I’m well aware of the successes of women in our current wars. It’s an area I’m fairly interested in, personally, as I’m a big fan of women (Really, I think they’re the best thing since… anything). Note that I give credit where due, or at least try to. Women are a valuable part of the armed forces.
However – Women in Special Operations are a no-go at present, and will be a difficult transition when it comes.
If, and I could be completely off base here, the ideal selection pool for these TETs is the SO community, that’s already going to make the integration of women a difficulty, as there aren’t any. Bringing them in from elsewhere could damage team cohesiveness and raise other issues.
Also if I’m right in my understanding of the role of women in Pashtun tribes, women could be more detrimental to the overall mission than helpful.
I don’t think this is a womens rights, or a women’s capability, issue so much as it is an issue of what will, and won’t, work for the mission.
Again, I’d like to hear some commentary on people who truly know, on both these issues, and welcome being schooled by a true SME.
Thanks for the discussion so far!
My aim is not to steal the thunder of this very powerful series of articles on tribal engagement and divert it into an argument on gender in the military, but to engage us further in this discussion on what a truly successful TET would look like.
I never meant this to be an argument about women’s rights.
It’s about thinking out of the box to achieve mission success.
Women might be integral.
Joanne and Morgan,
Women are already an integral part of the war. They man check points, they patrol, they get shot at, they shoot back, they save lives and some of them go into villages. I don’t think female counterparts to American males have to specifically be SO at all. The Women Marines have been very successful in their interactions with the Afghan women. The last 8 years have brought military females to the forefront and many have proven that skills, ability, courage, audacity are not specific to traditional combat jobs exclusive to men. PFC Monica Brown was the only female when her patrol was hit and she did not think twice about running through a field of fire to save her buddies. I can tell you that when my husband was trapped in a burning vehicle in Iraq, the American male soldiers on his team stood by and did nothing to save him. Those POS bastards were going to watch him burn to death. It was an Iraqi Officer who risked his life to save my husband. Had he 6 females like Monica Brown, they would have saved him without hesitation or reservation. Additionally, while not necessarily on TETs, Special Operations females in Civil Affairs and PSYOP engage indigenous women all over the world. I can tell you from personal experience, without SO training of any kind, women in societies like Afghanistan and Iraq find American women fascinating. If for anything, that they are in a military uniform fighting along side the men. Of course, the males in that society have a complete opposite opinion but, who cares? The women are very curious about us and are amazed by the simple freedoms we enjoy. I believe that if MAJ Gant’s TET concept were implemented today, females would be a very viable asset…the Women Marines have proven it. I only wish we could get one of them give us some insight….
Ma’am, with all due respect, it appears you’re arguing for things you don’t fully grasp.
Saying “Of course, the males in that society have a complete opposite opinion but, who cares?” represents a real failure to understand the environment or the stakes. The men are everything there. This isn’t a womens lib issue… It’s a war issue.
The above comments have assessed the situation pretty good. It’s terrible that your husband had that experience, and great that there’s women who can act bravely in our Army. That doesn’t represent most of the men in the military though.
Above comments are right when they say if the tribal teams are doing direct action, the best candidates are going to be male. Those men would brave hell for a comrade, and are absolutely a different breed of soldier. Do some googling on Major Gant if you dont understand what that kind of man will do for their team.
I track what you’re saying completely Giselle, and have been very aware of the role women have been playing for the last eight years outside the wire – another reason to have brought this question to this forum.
Women have been active in both kinetic and counter-insurgent environments during these engagements because they have obvious intrinsic and strategic importance to the fight and because forward thinkers in the military (male commanders in the USMC came up with this? now that’ll bust a civilian stereotype) put them there.
While women already have proved themselves in direct action as turret gunners, MPs and medics under fire, those of us here who insist on restricting this discussion to fitness for combat are missing the far bigger picture of what this type of longterm mission involves.
It is about complete, longterm cultural immersion.
And again, it’s easy for us to get stuck in stereotypes. Why do so many males in so many backwater villages in this Muslim culture so sincerely want their daughters to go to school?
Giselle – My apologies, I didn’t realize in my initial reply to you that I was speaking to a subject matter expert. I had a momentary failure of situational awareness, but intended no insult. Glad to have you in this discussion, Major.
I’d like to clarify a little, as I think there’s been an interpretation of my comments as negative towards women in the military, which wasn’t my intent.
What I took away from reading this post and the others is that the TET would be performing similarly to the classic Special Forces ODA among indigenous people, just on a long term scale.
Goal No. 3 above mentions the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Wouldn’t the PRT be the place, if my understanding is correct, for women engaging with local women “woman to woman”?
The Female Engagement Teams the Marine’s have fielded are doing good work, and it is important work. We cannot ignore a vast swath of the population and expect to make progress in the region. However, I think it is important that we uses the right resources, in the right way at the right time. My amateur take is that women have an extremely important role to play in Afghanistan, but maybe not in the TETs as outlined here, so much as in something related to that effort. Something the TET’s would make possible, by their work.
Also, I’d like to clarify for Joanne and others who may not grok the term – When I say Direct Action, I don’t just mean engaging in combat against enemy forces. I’m speaking in the terms the DOD uses to define Direct Action, to wit:
”Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.”
To my understanding women cannot be in a combat MOS, which I would hazard precludes participation in Direct Action.
I’m certainly not saying women are incapable, or haven’t proven themselves in combat – We certainly know better at this point in time. Nor am I saying women have no place in combat – I’m not even certain they don’t belong in Direct Action positions. However, at present time that is conjecture and opinion, and has little-to-no bearing on implementing teams now.
What we may wish, or believe in, nice as it may be has little to do with what’s in place currently. And whats in place currently, is whats available to work with building something new like this. One hurdle at a time, I would think.
Again I may be entirely off base, and overestimating the demand for DA on the TETs.
If there is a place for women in the TETs and they can be integrated and utilized to good ends, I’ll be thrilled. As I said above, the mission should be the most important. If women are necessary to that mission, then bring it on. As a supporter of women in the military, nothing would actually make me happier.
Giselle,
I have read this entire strings and am giggling. It is funny all of the assumptions people are making about you! Nick said to do some “googling” on MAJ Gant! Do itttt!
Seriously though, this proposal, as I see it is rooted in the foundation of SF and while simple in principle, and complicated in other ways should be considered from another perspective. If, hypothetically, we were invaded, and there were a war outside of my door everyday, and a group of trained, SF guys showed up on my doorstep and said hey, those taliban that are running all over trying to get into your home, and threaten your saftey, we don’t like them either. We want to help, can we move in? Can we teach you what you know? Will you teach us what you know? Can we pull our resources together? Can we help ensure you are doing all you can to keep your family safe? Can we be a part of that saftey? I would say yes, please help me and I will help you. I am only one man, but if we work together we can pull this off. It is the same principle if you move aside the politics, the big military, and the media . It is a solid, age old principle about the willingness of one man working with another to defeat a common enemy. While I do not mean to barney level this all, I can not help but consider it from this view, from mine if I were in the worn shoes of a village elder that had lived through the things this man has, and all of the other village elders of Afghanistan. It is not only a kind principle, in the way of a warrior helping a warrior, but I belive essential to winning this war.
MAJ Gant – question – in your upcoming installments of this paper, do you talk about the need to address cross cultural issues? What are your thoughts?