William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in various infantry and special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
ONE TRIBE AT A TIME
The Full Document at last!
By Steven Pressfield | Published: October 29, 2009
Download Major Jim Gant’s “One Tribe At A Time” to your computer, or view it right now.
[Because of the extraordinary response to Maj. Jim Gant's paper, One Tribe At A Time, I've decided to leave it up all week in the "Number One Slot." My ongoing interview with Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai will pick again next Friday; the Chief has been in Kabul all week, meeting with U.S. and British commanders, and we haven't had time to speak. So all's well that ends well!]
The downloadable and open-able .pdf of One Tribe is here, on the right. On a personal note, let me say again that I consider it a privilege to offer this document in full, not only because of my great respect for Maj. Jim Gant, who has lived and breathed this Tribal Engagement idea for years, but for the piece itself and for the influence it is already having within the U.S. military and policymaking community.
One Tribe At A Time is by no means a super-pro Beltway think tank piece. What it is, in my opinion, is an idea whose time has come, put forward by an officer who has lived it in the field with his Special Forces team members–and proved it can be done. And an officer, by the way, who is ready this instant to climb aboard a helicopter to go back to Afghanistan and do it again.
Questions and comments
At the moment, Maj. Gant is at Fort Polk, Louisiana, getting ready to deploy to Iraq, where he will lead an Iraqi commando battalion. He’ll be available in the meantime, however (depending of course upon time demands), to answer questions or take criticisms. Just respond in the comments section below. And I myself have further thoughts I’d like to offer on this subject in the coming weeks.
Here’s a quick one:
The most common response I anticipate to the Tribal Engagement concept (and it’s a valid criticism, shared by Maj. Gant) will go something like this: “Yeah, this is a great idea–but where are we going to find the men to implement it?”
Men for the job
Tribal Engagement Team members, should this concept be adopted, would be called upon to commit for multiple tours under the loneliest, harshest and most hazardous conditions imaginable. To succeed with the tribe they are assigned to, they would have to demonstrate impeccable combat credentials and, even rarer, possess the “people skills” to establish and maintain rapport across a cultural chasm—Western to Tribal Afghan—that has defeated every outside entity from Alexander the Great to the British and the Soviets. The task would be extraordinarily difficult, dirty and dangerous, and in the end would almost certainly be rewarded neither by career advancement (because the enterprise would be unprecedented and outside the normal channels of military promotion) nor by recognition from the public at large, who in all probability will rarely hear of it and wouldn’t understand or appreciate it if they did.
How can we identify and attract such men?
Do you remember this tiny, three-line ad from the London Times, December 29, 1913?
Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honour and recognition in case of success.
5000 volunteers queued up in response to this advertisement, posted by Ernest Shackleton seeking crewmen for his Antarctic expedition.
I may be wrong, but I don’t think our young American warriors would respond with any less enthusiasm than their British cousins did a century ago to a similar call. Do you?
Again, many thanks to Maj. Jim Gant for writing One Tribe At A Time, to Printer Bowler for designing and editing the .pdf and to Callie Oettinger for managing the outreach. I’m proud to put this document in circulation with as much reach as this modest blog can offer. We all hope it proves of interest and of use.
Dear Major Gant,
I have just finished reading your “One tribe at a time” strategy. Your views on the tribal approach are, at the very least, interesting and thought provoking. I have the following comment though:-
In the event the TETs are deployed on a national level, how would you address potential inter-tribal conflicts where the tribes involved have their own and separate TETs? Would this be a scenario where the American TETs would have to favour one tribe over the other as regardless of the independance of the TETs, American soldiers would nonetheless be subject to the US chain of command?
You do have my support for what you have already accomplished in Afghanistan especially the efforts you have made to understand and live with the tribes. Not many people would be brave and selfless enough to risk their lives for the purpose of making life for foreigners in a foreign land better and this is what needs to be done in Afghanistan. Thanks for your time.
Zaki
Zaki,
Thanks for reading the blog and posting. This question was asked earlier by “Joe” but I get asked thid quite often so I will address it again as it is extremely important:
Here is what I think…First, the reason we first went to Mangwel was because of a “problem”. That “problem” was a fued withing the same tribe. Now this is where things get “sticky”…We very rarely operate in the “black” or the “white”…it is usually in the “grey”. I would venture to say the great teams spend almost all of their time there…so, I decided with very little actual information to tell Malik Noorafzhal that we would support him in whatever he wanted to do. Risky? I don’t know – but it was a good decision. Now to your question: Obviousely TETs would not “face off” against one another…now, as it is with security and protection, it is the relationship you have with the tribal leader that will decide what happens. Now, everything you have done since day one to build a true relationship with the tribal leader and his advisors come into play. Do you have enough “influence without authority” to keep this from happening? Can you influence the underlying issue/problem? Does the other TET have more influence than you? Can you make him see why we can’t do this? Can you and the other TET work “together” to find a mutually beneficial solution? Do you understand the culture enough, to include Pashtunwali, to use it to your advantage? Can you also determine when, in the worst case scenario , you know you can no longer influence the situation and the other TET is in danger? What do you do now? Have you planned for it? Do you stay? Does just one TET exfil? Do you both?
So! As you can see – I do not have the answer. I believe that “being there” with the right people can keep situations like this to a minimum. In closing, one of the most important pieces of information that a TET would need would be as much information as possible on the “human terrain” in the entire area. I would want to know prior to “infil” if possible, if a situation like this existed.
But I can assure you this…I would want other great team members with me to help me deal with a situation like this.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
Jim,
I was reading the below article from John J. Kruzel and felt it reinforces my case that even when we know what right looks like, we can’t put a square peg in the square hole. I think based on your extensive experience in AF ( and the Tribal Insight) that you would be a great candidate for “Af-Pak” Hands.
Why do you think the Army won’t let you do it and are sending you to do a Training Team Mission in Iraq to work with Iraqi Security Forces? Important sure, but surely your skills and knowledge of AF would nest perfectly in AF-PAK Hands.
To me it is kind of a waste of talent? I wonder if the US Army Human Resources Command got the Mullen memo?
‘Af-Pak Hands’ Strives for Continuity in U.S. Mission
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27, 2009 – The U.S. military is building a cadre of officers who each will serve a multi-year assignment dedicated to a narrow piece of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Known as “Af-Pak Hands,” the program steeps officers in the language and culture of the region, and limits the range of their duties and focus on a single area for a four-to-five-year cycle. Officers will serve in a similar job at home and downrange, an aspect of the program military officials say will enable them to create and maintain relationships with the local populace abroad, a lynchpin of counterinsurgency doctrine.
“They’ll be a group of experts that will learn to speak the local languages, understand the dialects, become attuned to the culture and remain focused on the problem for an extended period, rather than just on a rotation basis,” a military official said, speaking on background.
In a normal rotation cycle, troops returning to the United States from deployment would likely occupy a different job from the one they held downrange. But the continuity of Af-Pak Hands would reduce the learning curve usually attendant to fresh boots on the ground, with officers building on their knowledge of local culture, language and tribal dynamics upon each of multiple, relatively short deployments.
“The idea is that you’re not reinventing the wheel each time a new servicemember replaces an old one,” another defense official speaking on background said of the program. The department has identified 300 billets that will comprise Af-Pak Hands personnel, including 121 new positions created as part of the initiative.
Af-Pak Hands training began recently, with about 30 officers enrolled in courses taught by the Defense Language Institute, the department’s flagship language and cultural training center. Dari, Pashto and Urdu – the region’s three dominant tongues – make up the 16-week language curriculum.
The initiative comes to fruition as President Barack Obama and his advisors weigh decisions on the next phase of the Afghan war. The debate is said to cover a spectrum of proposals ranging from deploying more troops to a narrower, scaled-down approach that moves away from the counterinsurgency model.
Counterinsurgency is a form of warfare in which a civilian population is in the center of a tug-of-war between an insurgency and the forces attempting to stop it. The Army and Marine Corps in late 2006 published a counterinsurgency strategy written by a host of contributors, and its implementation is credited with helping to reverse violence in Iraq.
“If the strategy remains a counterinsurgency strategy and that’s where the White House takes us, then [Af-Pak Hands] will be critical in the ‘clear, hold and build’ classic counterinsurgency strategy,” the military official said. “You want to get to the point where you relate to the general populace and you’ve built the trust, so that it’s more the population pushing the Taliban out than you trying to pull them out.”
Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the program, which has garnered support from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of forces in Afghanistan earlier this year. Career fields that apply include intelligence, special operations, combat arms and engineering, and could include civil-military operators, a military official said.
“The program goes back to a focus that both Admiral Mullen and General McChrystal had on wanting to maintain some continuity, and understanding that the key to the counterinsurgency effort is building the relationships,” the official said.
“And your best opportunity to build those relationships is to have the same faces and the same understanding of the language and culture. If you’re going to nurture that relationship and really build the trust that you need, it’s got to be a sustained effort.”
Tours of duty, which are expected to be primarily in the contentious southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, will last six to 12 months, the official said. Duty stations domestically include the Joint Staff’s Pakistan-Afghanistan coordination cell in the Pentagon; U.S. Central Command’s Center of Excellence or U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla.; and the Joint Special Operations Command in North Carolina, among other possible locations.
The program is being coordinated through the U.S. Central Command, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, U.S. Joint Forces Command and the military services. Service branches are identifying officers for participation in the program, which will comprise a joint force with members of all branches and possibly a civilian component, a military official said.
What do you think? Is the above the real deal or just another information operation?
Jorge
Dear MAJ Gant,
Thank you for your concise paper. Thank you and your team for your service. Allah willing, your orders will be revised and you return to Mangwel to be reunited with Malik Noorafzal and continue your work. You are needed there more than you are needed in Iraq. Continuity needs to be maintained.
I commented about the opium problem on the SWJ site. It may seem tongue-in-cheek but I am dead serious. I believe marijuana is one of the best sources of biodiesel and is a good fit for Afghanistan’s agrarian economy.
Your quote below brought a tear. You are willing to bet your life on it. My prayer is with you and all who pursue your career path with the same commitment:
“I emphasized at the beginning of this paper that I
am neither a strategist nor an academic. I know there
will be many criticisms that span all levels of war,
from military personnel to pundits.
But I also know this: I will get on a helicopter
tonight, armed with an AK-47 and 300 rounds of
ammunition and put my life on the line and my strategy
to the test. Will you do the same?”
Lastly, I have mused for years about an “Armed Peace Corps”. ODA 316 is an excellent example of that. I agree completely with your thesis. Commitment is paramount. I still seethe when I think of Nixon/Kissinger’s “commitment” to the Hmong. THIS CAN NOT BE REPEATED!
De Oppresso Liber!
Salaam eleikum Sir!
Marzouq the Redneck Muslim
Marzouq,
I liked your post. Thanks. two things you mentioned that I will address. First, my team was extremely violent and aggressive. We (like many other ODAs) went for the throat – every time. However, at the same time, the greatest acts of compassion I have ever witnessed came from the same group of men. Second, as I say in the paper, the worst case sceanario is one where we gain a tribe(s) trust and then abondon them somewhere down the road. The second we decide to do this tribal engagement strategy (TES) even if it is with only one tribe, we must commit to arm them (heavily) after we leave, to give them a fighting chance. I hope once we make a committment to a tribe(s) we do it for the long haul.
we aliiikum es-salaam…
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim
Major Gant,
Thank you for your reply. My prayers are with you as with all those who risk all.
I hope our govt sees the wisdom in your paper. It exhibitted fine traits such as honor, discipline, integrity, courage and compassion. These are the fine qualities that gain trust.
Salaam.
m
Hello MAJ Gant, I read your paper with great interest. I served at Kandahar Airfield from October 2007 to October 2008 as Command Judge Advocate for ARSIC-S and Legal Mentor to my counterparts in the Afghan Army at Hero Camp. I was also exposed to the Afghan formal criminal justice system, what there is of it as part of an assessment team in Zabul Province. As a lawyer, I think you are right on target when you advocate strengthening Pashtunwali and the tribal justice system. The formal justice system, where it exists, lacks the trust of Afghans, with good reason. It is corrupt.
Kevin,
How goes it? I have already spoken to you off line…It might happen. Stand-by! The Afghan “govermental” judicial system is broke…my question to you is – is it fixable? Why don’t we just let the tribes do what they have always done? Don’t some of the tribes have viable judicial “systems”? The Taliban uses some type of “rule of law” to gain footholds in some areas. They use Shar’ia law do they not? Shar’ia law is in direct conflict with Pashtunwali in some cases. I believe we should be able to exploit that. Please, anything you could add to this subject would be of great importance to me and others. You know how to reach me!
Thanks again for writing.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim
These are interesting ideas and questions. A good place to pose the questions and get them in front of more interested legal researchers, practitioners and scholars would be to join the International Network to Promote Rule of Law (http://inprol.org) and pose them in one of the forums. INPROL was setup precisely to handle these kinds of questions. I’d be happy to make introductions if you aren’t already connected with them.
Major Gant
Thank you – what a insight and what a writer you are as well.
Everything you say rings true. I have lived and worked in many tribal areas – Saudi in the 70’s, Botswana in the 60’s and Ghana in the 50’s.
I think that you can add an element to your intent – The British had a core of “political agents” in country as well. Like your TET’s these were made up of men who made a long term commitment to the local culture. They would learn the language and grow up along side their Tribal partners. By the time they were in their 40’s they knew maybe as much as the locals.
I think that a Tribal approach would best if your very local and “hard” aspect was supported by a regional “soft” aspect that was very political – added to a “Viceroy”.
Let me explain. Clay Christenson is very clear that “disruptive change” will attract massive retaliation from the status quo. It is not enough to have a handful of very senior folks say yes. Big Army will go all out to kill this. Why? because, if this works – and it should! – they are doomed. The US goes from datge 2 – stage 5 in one go. So be assured, they will do all they can to undermine this and you.
Martin Luther faced the same challenge. His “viceroy” his Elector. Without the support of his Prince, he would have gone to the stake. Plus he had something that you do have. He had access to to anew information technology that looped the establishment – the printing press – you have the internet and Steve.
Luther ensured his survival by making a deal with the North German Princes – go with me and you get rid of the control of the Pope and the Emperor.
I say all of this because as an old hand, I know that you are right and that your ideas will immediately flag the “boys” about how dangerous you and your ideas are.
So being right will not be enough.
You are going to have to be as smart as Luther is staying “alive” and in winning the support that you will need to keep the “boys” from killing you and your ideas.
Please be Luther and not Jan Hus
Rob Paterson,
Thank you for reading the paper and posting…that was a great post and I get it…but…I usually say and do what I think is best and so far it has worked out OK. And by the way, best and right are two different things. A lot of the times they are the same decision, but sometimes they aren’t.
I have found that in most cases, the most senior leaders desperately want the truth, the unvarnished truth. Sometimes they can effect change, sometimes they can’t. I try and be careful unless I have done what they are trying to do…
Thank you again for your post.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
For those who are interested, here is a terrific video interview with Lt. Col. Allen West, U.S. Armey (Ret. 2007) who bears out what Major Gant is talking about. Hat tip to The Captain’s Journal who have this featured.
http://blogs.cbn.com/stakelbeckonterror/archive/2009/10/28/lt.-col.-allen-west-on-afghanistan-strategy.aspx
MAJ Gant:
First, thank you for your service. Our nation can never fully repay you and your comrades.
I think that I understand what you are proposing, but I’m not sure how this approach would provide substantial benefits in the war on jihadism (more accurate than the title “war on terror”, I think). Afghanistan is and presumably will remain an insignificant backwater as far as I can see. In that way, it is no different than Somalia or Yemen. Certainly it is a concern insofar as al-Qaeda or similar groups can use its territory. But that is true also for Somalia, Yemen or for that matter Germany or the United Kingdom. Yes, we can engage the tribes, but to what end? If engagement is a matter of arming and funding tribes to kill Taliban or al-Qaeda and provide intelligence, does this require your approach?
Mr. Katz, I empathize completely with your skepticism about where even the noblest efforts will lead us in Afghanistan and other beleaguered countries on this planet. It seems that almost every act of goodwill and bonding among different peoples is eventually undone by the powers that be. Those who rule this footstool kingdom, those who harvest fortunes from the misfortunes of common people, are concerned only with political and economic dominion. To the global power brokers at home and abroad, human lives are but scrap metal for the graceless glitz of their worldly estates. For them, there’s no money in peace, and much profit in war.
Humanity’s forlorn zeitgeist would be lamentable, but for one thing: Wherever one human heart nurtures the fire of hope and the willingness to enact it, there is the salvation of this world. Be it in Afghanistan or any other realm, helping people “on the ground where they live” is the measure that keeps everything from going completely to hell.
Major Gant is one who understands that the “war on jihadism” can’t be won by military means alone. He understands that we have to give people legitimate reason to abandon Islamic (and worldwide) fanaticism, and at the same time offer real protection for families and communities under seige. We have to replace the discontent and disillusionment (that Afghans have with America and many of their own countrymen) with genuine acts of consideration and helpfulness. American foreign policy in the last 50 years, especially the last 10, has done more to instigate radical Islam than anything native to their own teachings. Our old imperative of imposing the imperial “white man’s way” on those who have no need or interest in it will only lead to more failure and conflict.
In other words, it’s all about embracing others (who are willing, and there are millions) as family rather than strangers. The jihadists aren’t interested in that approach, and neither are the politicians and their banker, oil-baron and arms-manufacturer sponsors. Those two groups are battling endlessly over geo-political and economic control. The majority caught in the middle are getting hammered, as always, from both sides. Though I can’t speak for him, Major Gant obviously has formed a real bond with these “middle people.” He’s working toward a strong, humane solution to the life-and-death dilemma of regular folks surrounded by heartless adversaries—from American-sponsored, warlord-driven Karzai to the Taliban in the hills. It’s about far more than killing Taliban and al-Qaeda. It’s about protecting families who have children, hopes and dreams just like the rest of us.
Regardless of the lamentable history of how we got involved in Afghanistan, the least we can do is help those indigenous peoples who want nothing more than to be left to their own traditional tribal ways of life. America was instrumental in putting them in this fix, therefore we are responsible to help them out of it. We and the majority of Afghan tribes share a common enmity with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. By helping the tribes, we will make allies where jihadists once had free reign. We will restore a bit of bloom to the tarnished American soul whose misadventures have come back to haunt us all. That’s the right and responsible thing to do.
Our “war on jihadism” needs a huge injection of person-to-person bonding with the common people of Afghanistan (not to mention every other country on the planet). That eventually could bring down our military presence there while steadily undermining ground support for the Islamic radicals. In the never-ending end, who knows? Maybe we can still advance a couple steps for every one gone wayward.
Mr. Bowler and Mr. Katz,
I just want to comment on your references to “the war on jihadism” and the “middle people”. Once you get out of Kabul the current situation in Afghanistan is one of survival. The people are simply trying to survive day to day, it really is not about any “ism” or agenda, it is simply about survival. If the Taliban are going to help you survive then you work with the Taliban, if Al-Qaeda is going to help you survive then you work with Al-Qaeda, if the Americans are going to help you survive you work with the Americans,etc, etc. But if you ask most Afghans they will tell you that they would rather side with and work with the Americans, however, it is about survival and making it through today is what wins out in the end.
The Afghan people are tired, they have been at “war” fighting for their survival since 1979, when the Russians invaded. Prior to the Russian invasion life in Afghanistan was actually pretty good and tribally democratic. So they got rid of the Russians and then the Taliban and Al-Qaeda moved in and stirred things up again. The problem is that the Afghan people are still trying to recover from the damage the Russians inflicted upon them and are not at 100% in order to keep at bay the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They need a helping hand to get back on their feet.
Now this is where we as Americans mean well, but begin to err. We think everyone thinks and executes everything just like we do and if they don’t they should. This is where we lose a lot of respect with the Afghans. The Afghan way of doing things may be different, but that doesn’t make it wrong. What would success in Afghanistan be…help the people of Afghanistan, the tribes, fully recover and be able to once again take care of themselves and they will be able to keep the bad guys in check.
Would TETs lend themselves to sharing space with NGOs? Adopt a platoon is great but there are only so many times you can send a box of _fill in the blank_ (happy to do so) before you begin to wonder about reaching out to the population those beloved service members meet. Sister cities come to mind. The toy drives were nice. As is the recent Texas vs. Oklahoma clothing drive. Must it only be done through military mail for specific service members? But then NGOs seem to want the Tammany Hall system the tribes are resisting. And rightly so with Qangos costing the UK $13 billion a year and G-d knows how much in the US. Mission-creep? Good luck and Blessings.
We worked hand in hand with the NGOs in our area. The biggest issues for the NGOs in 2003-2004 was security. So when dealing with the local tribal leadership we would always make it very clear that the sooner an area was deemed safe, the sooner the NGOs would move in and provide help and support to the local population. This was a great motivation and time and time again the local leadership eagerly and sucessfully worked with us, the US military, to get rid of the bad guys, which resulted in a safe and secure environment for the NGOs to move into. It wasn’t always perfect, but the steadily improved during the entire year we were in the Paktia/Khowst provinces.
I would hope that you would realize that you and others can develop all the wonderful plans that you are capable of but they will be for naught as we have a CinC whose domestic political agenda is more important to him and his immediate associates than victory in war .
Dr Fanning
Do you not feel that perhaps we have had enough doomsaying and petty soapboxing? How do you expect to change the direction of the US Government (by ‘the people’, for ‘the people’, from ‘the people’?) if not through ‘the people’? By that I mean people like MAJ Gant and others who have displayed some initiative and gone and done something that they believe in, and which is circulating at many levels in many nations. The information militia concept supposes that, like the militia of old, ‘the people’ can change the world through information.
The outcome of the campaign in Afghanistan will be decided by ‘the people’, not of Afghanistan but of the USA…the ball is YOUR court, what are YOU going to do? Pick it up or choke…
It is not just about developing a plan, it is about getting the word out to our fellow comrades on the ground about what works and what does not and sharing our knowledge and lessons learned. In doing so this will hopefully allow those who follow us to be more effective quicker and not have to re-invent the wheel.
http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/10/02/WP.html