William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in various infantry and special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
ONE TRIBE AT A TIME
The Full Document at last!
By Steven Pressfield | Published: October 29, 2009
Download Major Jim Gant’s “One Tribe At A Time” to your computer, or view it right now.
[Because of the extraordinary response to Maj. Jim Gant's paper, One Tribe At A Time, I've decided to leave it up all week in the "Number One Slot." My ongoing interview with Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai will pick again next Friday; the Chief has been in Kabul all week, meeting with U.S. and British commanders, and we haven't had time to speak. So all's well that ends well!]
The downloadable and open-able .pdf of One Tribe is here, on the right. On a personal note, let me say again that I consider it a privilege to offer this document in full, not only because of my great respect for Maj. Jim Gant, who has lived and breathed this Tribal Engagement idea for years, but for the piece itself and for the influence it is already having within the U.S. military and policymaking community.
One Tribe At A Time is by no means a super-pro Beltway think tank piece. What it is, in my opinion, is an idea whose time has come, put forward by an officer who has lived it in the field with his Special Forces team members–and proved it can be done. And an officer, by the way, who is ready this instant to climb aboard a helicopter to go back to Afghanistan and do it again.
Questions and comments
At the moment, Maj. Gant is at Fort Polk, Louisiana, getting ready to deploy to Iraq, where he will lead an Iraqi commando battalion. He’ll be available in the meantime, however (depending of course upon time demands), to answer questions or take criticisms. Just respond in the comments section below. And I myself have further thoughts I’d like to offer on this subject in the coming weeks.
Here’s a quick one:
The most common response I anticipate to the Tribal Engagement concept (and it’s a valid criticism, shared by Maj. Gant) will go something like this: “Yeah, this is a great idea–but where are we going to find the men to implement it?”
Men for the job
Tribal Engagement Team members, should this concept be adopted, would be called upon to commit for multiple tours under the loneliest, harshest and most hazardous conditions imaginable. To succeed with the tribe they are assigned to, they would have to demonstrate impeccable combat credentials and, even rarer, possess the “people skills” to establish and maintain rapport across a cultural chasm—Western to Tribal Afghan—that has defeated every outside entity from Alexander the Great to the British and the Soviets. The task would be extraordinarily difficult, dirty and dangerous, and in the end would almost certainly be rewarded neither by career advancement (because the enterprise would be unprecedented and outside the normal channels of military promotion) nor by recognition from the public at large, who in all probability will rarely hear of it and wouldn’t understand or appreciate it if they did.
How can we identify and attract such men?
Do you remember this tiny, three-line ad from the London Times, December 29, 1913?
Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honour and recognition in case of success.
5000 volunteers queued up in response to this advertisement, posted by Ernest Shackleton seeking crewmen for his Antarctic expedition.
I may be wrong, but I don’t think our young American warriors would respond with any less enthusiasm than their British cousins did a century ago to a similar call. Do you?
Again, many thanks to Maj. Jim Gant for writing One Tribe At A Time, to Printer Bowler for designing and editing the .pdf and to Callie Oettinger for managing the outreach. I’m proud to put this document in circulation with as much reach as this modest blog can offer. We all hope it proves of interest and of use.
Five British soldiers and three Afghans were killed yesterday by a disaffected (?) Afghan policeman.
Most people in Britain want the troops brought home straightaway.
I think the main reason they remain there is that the British Government doesn’t want to leave the Americans in the lurch. The usual mantra “To keep the streets of Britain safe from terrorism” won’t wash – its widely dismissed.
Mr. Kharzai deported two senior British officials not long ago because they were talking to the Taliban.
If the Taliban is not the enemy – it’s Al-Qaeda, stupid – why not reach an accommodation with the Taliban?
The sooner the better.
The Brits in Afghanistan is a beast all of its own. I know most are probably going to think I am crazy, but again, the Afghans do not always see things the way we do. To the Afghans the British are a vanquished enemy, so from the get go the British are behind the power curve. What ??…yes, the Aghans see the British as a vanquished enemy (which they are) and even though it is 2009 and not the 1800-1900s the Afghans don’t forget. If you talk to most Afghans they speak as though Alexander the Great just dropped by yesterday.
Why all the trouble in Helmand, where the British were located before the Marines moved in…Governor Akhundzada was removed.
Governor Akhundzada was by no means an angel, but he was/is pro-US and anti-Taliban/Al-Qaeda and he was from the most powerful tribe in Helmand Province. As a result Governor Akhundzada held the respect of the people of Helmand Province and was able to keep the “bad guys” (Taliban, Al-Qaeda and whomever else) in check. But in 2005 the British insisted Governor Ahkundzada be removed and he was replaced by an outsider. His replacement Daoud was dead in the water from day one and was eventually replaced. They are now on their third or fourth governor since Akhundzada and no one other than a local powerful Helmand province tribal elder is going to be able to bring peace back to Helmand, not the Brits, not the US military, no one. But we westerners just don’t get it.
I am by no means saying the attack is warranted or right, just trying to shed some insite as to why the British did and the US military is having such a hard time in southern Afghanistan.
I think you’ve raised an important point here….when I had first received news some years back that the British were going to land troops in Helmand, I couldn’t believe what I was hearing. It had disaster written all over it…..and you’re right, Afghans have a long memory of friends and foes alike. I laugh my head off every day when I hear the British threaten to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan…..if I can offer any advice, it would be that the British should stop making too much noise and restrain themselves behind the American military leadership. Britain can not wash off the stain of her colonial past with a military engagement, no matter how good their intentions. The Americans on the other hand – if correctly understood by Afghans – are the antidote to old Europe, representing the forces of good on this Earth, beginning with their declaration of independance from the Brits, a fact that needs to be drilled into Afghans. I can’t even begin to tell you how the British military involvement in Afghanistan is viewed by Afghans indulging in conspiracy theories (that would be most of them) as naked revenge for their past failures…..can’t get any more FUBAR than this ;~)
Barekzai,
Once again – thanks for posting…There is a lot of good stuff coming on the blog…so stay tuned.
What I wanted to tell you is that I just got finished researching the “First Anglo-Afghan War”…I made the comment to my wife (based on my personal experience with the tribe I was with and how they talked about time) that the Pashtuns had not forgotten and will never forget what happened with the British starting in 1838. The issue between Shah Shuja, Ranjit Singh and Dost Mohammed was the key “inter-personal factor” that caused the British to commit troops. From the research I have done; lies were told about Dost Mohammed that were used to give the British a reason to put troops on the ground…the rest is history…
“Hard is not hopeless; but history may be..”
Once again, keep your insight coming…and I will wait for your email.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
Jim,
Thank you for responding, I am honored to forward you my Email and have done so as requested. When it comes to Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, even though he gave his word to the British of his intended friendship and acted in no way to the contrary, he was still rewarded by a brazen betrayal. As for Shah Shuja or Ranjit Singh, they were both useful idiots to the British Raj and would have told them anything for securing their support towards their own whims of conquest. The British were a post-enlightenment power, with the likelihood to act on facts and reasoning, rather than on rumors and innuendos perpetrated by scoundrels whose words were only as useful as their value to British interests. To most political wannabes among Afghans however, the greatest act of hostility towards Afghanistan was less so the British efforts at direct conquest, than it was with their having left behind a new state called Pakistan over lands that are clearly Afghan. The way I see it, the current war is 60 years old, with its seeds planted over a century ago. Those Afghan leaders like Amanullah Khan or the Communist PDPA whose fascination with the Nanny state produced a backlash that helped the enemy, only serve to present footnotes that mark Afghan setbacks in what is a greater war. As Thomas Jefferson once stated, “the tree of liberty is sprinkled with the blood of tyrants and patriots alike” (apologies for any inaccuracy in quotation him from memory).
Jeremy Passmore,
Remove any thought of a meaningful conversation with the Taliban organization. Impossible. They’re as much terrorist as Al-Queda is. What they proceeded to do to Afghanistan post Soviet war was deplorable. One of the most ruthless Authoritarian movements in recent memory. Unfortunately, the American government bares the responsibility for allowing such an organization to rise to power. Hind-sight can always be 20/20, what we ought to have done, vs. what was done. As I said, that was unfortunate. Let us also not forget that Al-Queda, and other Islamic extremist organizations are in fact, at war with anyone who is not. There is no country immune to their hatred. To think otherwise is to forget history, and forget that these terrorist groups still thrive. “Dismissing the threat” is a regretful decision, 9/11 proved that to America, I sincerely hope no others endure such a wake up call…
I serve mine for these very reasons. Because I know, and have seen, an enemy that absolutely, 100%, hates my country, and would stop at nothing to hurt my fellow countrymen. I was happy I faced this enemy on the streets of his city and not in the borders of mine.
Having worked SE Afghanistan (Paktia, Khost, Ghazni)/2003, Iraq and several countries in Africa…”tribalism” is word that brings particular significance to me personally. Tribalism is the greatest obstacle for any unified government.!
In the case of MAJ Gant’s proposition..just a few comments.
It has been the objective of the previous Administration and perhaps the current one a strong a centralized Afgh government. The “marketing” of Karzai and his government in Kabul normally has little or no impact because of the tribal cultures, religion (west/Shia versus east/Sunni), language/dialects, clans and historical alliances in Afghanistan. Some elders joked Karzia was rather the “mayor of Kabul” rather than the elected President.
That said, few would disagree… a centralized ïn control” government is Kabul is virtually impossible. Even the ANA is tribal..and many do not trust the other…they are essentially in the army for compensation…nothing more. Ask the guys who fought at Wanat (173rd-13 July 2008) how many ANA got into that fight-
I have supported a regional approach based in part on tribal alliances as the foundation for some sort of sustained “peace” in Afghanistan. The terrain of Afghanistan is the marker that has in the past defined these various regions. But, there are many caveats-
That said, a regional or tribal approach is far from the centralized approach now into it 8th year of implementation and it is doubtful Karzai would ever agree to some “partition” based on tribal alliances. What might materialize is a greater civil war…the Pashtun’s against the other tribes, since they make up about 40% of the population in Afghanistan (and would have the full support of the Pakistani’s and ISI).
Unfortunately, there is no single strategy that may accomplish the “mission” in Afghanistan; but, rather a set of metrics which might allow US to begin withdrawal/retrograde from Afghanistan which may include the regional or tribal approach.
I can recall sitting in a shura meetings with elders who had experienced the massive bombing assault in late 2001 and early 2002 by US forces. When I asked them…what we could do for them in terms of reconstruction..they replied that there was nothing we could do for them..except let them do what they have done for centuries.
At that moment, we were offered a Coke…when the cans of Coke arrived a few moments later, there was crystallized ice instead the aluminum cans…yes..they apparently had refrigeration, So it goes!
This SF living among the villages, was that not the very intent of the creation of US Sf back in the early 60s aimed at the nam.
They did it back then as the French GCMA before therm, successfully to finally leave and let down the very people they came to “help” (or use, but they did not act or think that way, their commander did).
Needs very special people, ver dedicated with a free hand and a LONG stay, patience etc. What I saw elsewhere (M Yon I think) with stone buildings not tents.
I’d like to comment, if I might, on the current, and perhaps evolving, U.S. tribal engagement strategy in Afghanistan, and on the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, generally.
Whatever little wisdom I’ve managed to feebly cobble together on the subject of tribal engagement, counterinsurgency, and state-building derives from my two and half years of field experience spent as a civilian police advisor to the Iraqi police, all this spent among Sunnis, in Al Anbar (al-Dulaimi tribe) and Salah ad Din (al-Jabouri; al-Hadithi; al-Ubaidi tribes) provinces.
To establish my meager bona fides, during the late spring and summer of 20005 I had an opportunity to live and work alongside a Marine company at their FIRM base in Saqalawiyah, Iraq, standing up the first functional (post-Saddam, coalition-supported and recognized) IP station in Al Anbar province. My very anemic, layman’s knowledge of counterinsurgency, and of the arduous and oppressive demands placed on conventional soldiers in these environments, derives from my weeks and months spent living and working with these Marines—sharing, along the way, not an insignificant part of their deprivations and hazards. (My knowledge of military life in general derives from six years spent on active duty service in the U.S. Navy). After my just short of a year in Al Anbar, I spent over a year and a half working with Iraqi police commanders at the provincial level in Salah ad Din province. My knowledge of Arab Near Eastern society, and of Near Eastern tribal culture—a tribal culture that is very distinct in kind, but not wholly alien in form, from Afghanistan’s—hails from what has now been some two and half years, then, working routinely and intimately with Iraqis in rural, provincial areas outside Baghdad—in Sunni, tribal areas. My knowledge of state-building, and of the vital role played within it by a modern police force, as the chief enforcement and peacekeeping arm of the state, derives from a total of three and half years spent as a civilian police advisor in Iraq and from my ten years spent as a police officer and deputy sheriff in Chicago and Cook County (whence I know, also, about the pervasive, noxious power of corrupt, illegitimate governments).
This particular experience of tribes and counterinsurgency in Iraq inherently limits, of course, my knowledge of the distinctiveness of Afghan tribes and of the Afghan counterinsurgency. But it does not, to my mind, detract from my more general understanding of the political and cultural dynamics of tribes in Southwest Asia. Nor does it diminish from whatever small wisdom I’ve artlessly managed to fall upon relative to the basic social organization, function, and nature of tribes in not only the Near Eastern political context, but, analogously, the Central Asian.
I share this background, then, in order that I might have an opportunity to weigh in, with whatever scant credibility, on Major Gant’s analysis. Major Gant is, of course, entirely correct in his understanding and analysis of the nature of tribes and tribal engagement. His proposal for a strategy of tribal engagement via a deep and permanent local embedding of TETs, within a hopefully evolving counterinsurgent context and strategy, is trenchant, wise, and entirely correct. Though, I will seek to add an important addendum and codicil to Major Gant’s analysis.
Tribal society and culture, whether Near Eastern or Central Asian, is alien, inscrutable to Westerners. In a context of waging a counterinsurgent war this creates a particularly far-reaching problem and challenge for U.S. counterinsurgent operators, who, relative to such a society, are cultural outsiders. Insurgency implies a hidden enemy, one well ensconced within the local, general population. An enemy so hidden is, on its face, a daunting specter enough to grapple with under any circumstances. The insurgent, by nature, remains a shadowy and elusive foe, even when the host society and culture is entirely familiar to the counterinsurgent operator; that is, even when the counterinsurgent is wholly accustomed to, understands, can relate to—through common language, social organization, values, and customs—and can thus penetrate, the ambient social and culture environment. But when this insurgent enemy is hidden within a fundamentally alien, inscrutable society and culture, the counterinsurgent faces a very tall order, indeed, in seeking to identify, separate out, and defeat such a furtive enemy.
Victory in counterinsurgency thus requires, as a first order, identifying and locating the enemy from around and within the local, general population. Meanwhile, the local population, among whom the insurgent is hiding, may very well be disinclined, for some very good reasons, to assist counterinsurgent forces in this effort. This means that the general, local population, itself, must be the counterinsurgent operator’s first order of business. The local population must become the counterinsurgent’s first object of penetration, understanding, and familiarity. Counterinsurgent forces must, as a first act, make the indigenous population—now inscrutable and unfathomable—at once visible, transparent, accessible, and manageable.
This broad tactical mandate implies, within the present context, a series of operational and strategic tasks. First, the counterinsurgent has to establish a relationship of trust and mutual understanding (social and cultural) with the local population. This is a process made much more difficult in traditional tribal societies, where intimate, deeply personalized, relationships are the basis for all social and political transactions. By definition, these relationships can only be built over time and through routine, intimate exposure and interaction. In seeking to forge these relationships, the counterinsurgent operator must grasp that tribal societies do not operate on the basis of mere rational, economic self-interest (though this is hardly absent, in a milieu of bare material subsistence). Within every transaction, material or otherwise, there is a local, symbolic, cultural language being spoken. Oftentimes, what a cultural outsider, or visitor, thinks the transaction is about, on the surface, may often be about, in reality, something else—something much more important—entirely. (I know and understand these hidden contextual meanings within the framework of working with my tribal Iraqi counterparts. I wouldn’t dare to suggest that I at all understand these dynamics as they play out within entirely localized, culturally-specific, setting of Afghan tribal life. Moreover, each one of these dynamics is subtly impacted by the distinct personalities of local individuals, each of which, beyond the general cultural dynamics of tribal societies, channel and convey these meanings in subtly different ways. Without understanding the individual personalities, in concert with and against the larger tribal culture, much can be lost—another argument for long-term, embedding of U.S. advisors and for intimate relationship-building).
Second, the counterinsurgent, in the course of this local relationship-building, has to win over the host population, eventually, to the task of assisting in culling and giving up, if not casting out, the insurgent enemy around and among its civilian ranks. Only through information and assistance given by the local population can the counterinsurgent operator fist positively identify then eliminate the insurgent. Developing the sort of trust and interpersonal commitment with the local population required to inspire this effort takes time, intimacy, and permanence. All of these are directed prescribed and aptly fulfilled in Major Gant’s proposed strategy.
It is in the third task, as I conceive it, that I have to take issue with Major Gant: building a legitimate, sovereign Afghan state. There is no getting around this. Over the long-term (10 or 20 years, minimum) only an independently functioning, fully sovereign Afghan state can integrate a tribal population, which, along with insurgent groups and militias, is the chief competitor for the state’s power. As long as there are tribes, large populations who only vaguely recognize the state’s authority (if they do so at all), operating independent of the state’s institutions, there will always be within the nation’s borders an un-integrated shadow society, a society of un-citizens, among whom terrorist groups can operate, whom terrorists can intimidate, manipulate, and call on for support and assistance, volitional or otherwise.
It is through the TETs—and only through the TETs—that such a conventional surge strategy, centered on state-building, can be effectively implemented. The tribal population must be moved, if over generations, to the task of subordinating itself to the state. It must be inspired to take up the civic battle of demanding more from the state, demanding that it be more responsive and accountable. It is through TETs that this can happen. It is only through the TETs that this can happen.
On this reading, there is no getting around the task of providing General McCrystal with the additional forces he needs to build the instruments of an effectively functioning, sovereign Afghan state. These eventually bolstered state instruments will then be married, over time, to the tribes, through the liaison capability of the TETs—the U.S. social, cultural, and political intermediaries for the tribes, with whom the TETs have forged close, trusting relationships through their intimate, permanent embedment with them.
Ultimately, the tribes must eventually join the average citizen’s ranks within the general civic population. Otherwise, we will always rely on permanent U.S. embedment within the tribes to get them to do our—i.e., the sovereign Afghan state’s—bidding (to resist and combat terrorist and insurgents).
This, of course, has to be combined with the much more Sisyphean task of mitigating corruption in the Afghan government, minimizing it to less scandalous, more popularly acceptable proportions (it won’t be eliminated; it is a culturally embedded facet of life) in order to render the Afghan state more legitimate in the eyes of its nascent citizens.
Today, it breaks my heart to watch (as I did on a recent Frontline special on PBS) a scene so sadly reminiscent of my own personal experience in Iraq. In the inhospitable terrain of southern Afghanistan, in Halmand province, a 24-year old Marine NCO, working on three hours of sleep a night, in 130 degree heat, patrolling twelve hours a day, sleeping on dirt without air conditioning at night, wading through chest-high grass and thigh-high flooded fields during the day, with not the least amenity of civilization, tries to engage with the local tribal population. Standing before a small group of phlegmatic tribal elders, who squat in front of their mud huts, the young NCO oscillates between barking orders and imploring assistance, trying to squeeze out of these villagers some evidence of local cooperation for his campaign against the Taliban. In his manner and tone the youthful sergeant conveys physical exhaustion; fear and rage over recent attacks against his squad seep through his voice. Sadness and anger over fresh losses and injuries among his comrades weigh on him. Frustration and short-temper escape through his speech. All of this he channels against a local population that is entirely alien to and seemingly wholly uncooperative with him. Under even less oppressive conditions this NCO, at such a ripe age, with such relatively little life experience, with so little wisdom and emotional maturity, and with such limited training for the task put to him, is rendered all but culturally tone-deaf and impotent against this impenetrable, immovable society and culture.
Without embedded advisors who have all the qualities absent in this brave and dedicated young warrior, this marine NCO’s efforts, and those of his many comrades, passed from us and still patrolling, will have all been for naught. I can’t help but believe that Major Gant feels exactly the same way.
A two-pronged strategy, then, of “all-in” in Afghanistan is, by my dim lights, the only recipe for long-term U.S. victory: broad-based, permanent embedment of TETs, without which no surge can succeed (nor any sort of military strategy), combined with full support for General McCrystal’s state-building surge, without whose commitment of resources, personnel, and organizational effort (to build an effectively sovereign Afghan state) we will never be able to withdraw—to effectively delegate to the Afghan state—our direct tactical engagement in Afghanistan.
Thomas,
Your knowledge of all the subjects that you spoke of in your post was in a word: impressive. Thank you so much for taking the time, putting in the effort, and backing your beliefs up with experience, knowledge and answers. Mot people just say “it won’t work” and move onto to the next solution only to say “it won’t work”. I am looking forward to answering your post – out of respect – by the way, and I will attempt to draw more information from you as you clearly understand what a daunting task tribal engagement is. There are many obstacles and pitfalls. I believe the rewards, in the case of Afghanistan, far outweigh the downfalls. On a personal note, thank you for your service in Iraq. I spent 15 months with the Iraqi National Pilce QRF battalion out of Baghdad, and it was truly one of the most rewarding times of my life. Thank you for your service to our country – and your service to the Iraqi nation as well.
I will be answering your post, but you have earned the right for me to spend some time “framing the debate”…
Take care and don’t be safe.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
Thomas,
I haven’t forgotten you…
I am swamped…
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
I’ve read through MAJ Gant’s paper, and I’m not sure about his premise. Some of the things he recommends: that the Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) have the ability to approve their own missions, spend money as they see fit to help the tribe or help their standing within the tribe (as he puts it, “money and guns equal the ultimate power”), and a change in the rules of engagement to allow the TETs to “drop bombs or pursue an enemy as they see fit” – noting that it will be a “very intense, personal fight”.
His defining vignette in the early dealings with the tribe involved his promise to join with the malik in a tribal fight (p 17) -
OK. Glass half-full, a savvy dealing with the malik that could portend great things. Glass half-empty…Americans getting suckered into a big, ugly tribal gunfight that could turn into just the kind of incident that would cause a strategic communications disaster with lasting repercussions.
And to what end? Should we find the right tribe or sub-tribe that will help us get across the Durand Line to kill bin Laden and Zawahiri (a limited, defined goal) – or look to the tribes to help stabilize Afghan society (somewhat of a larger, ill-defined effort)? MAJ Gant’s observation in his preface seems to point to the latter – he states:
Matthew Hoh decried “valleyism” as the main problem with the coalition approach; MAJ Gant sees a form of it as the catalyst that will have a “long-term positive effect”.
I appreciate MAJ Gant’s passion and I sure don’t have the answers, but it’s those “pitfalls and difficulty” he references that should probably be fleshed out – - including: How do we square this with the host nation government – think of it what you will – objecting strenuously to this type of engagement?
John Burnham,
Thank you for writing and thank you for reading the paper. I will answer your concerns and comments the best that I know how over the internet, as much can be lost in translation, as you know.
First, it is very important to know that, in my case, “things” did work out. US forces in “Sitting Bull’s” area are still today reaping the benefits of the relationship that was built in 03. If you read David Kilcullen’s book,”The Accidental Guerrilla” (a very good book that I would highly recommend) he uses a “Konar case study” to make many of his points about what we should be doing in Afghanistan. In this particular case study he writes mainly about a paved road that got built from Jalalabad to Asadabad and how it impacted the overall COIN fight in the area. What is missing is how did this area get picked to have a road built? How was this area “secure” enough? Who were the major tribal players that supported the project? Who was against it? Well, if you will read “Gifts of Honor” which is on Steve’s web-site you will see that the relationship that was built between my team and Sitting Bull’s tribe lasted for many years and had a may I say “strategic impact” on what eventually took place in that part of Konar. Sitting Bull and his tribe are “major players” in that area. Even today, that area has some of the highest incidents of “Tribe vs Taliban” fighting. So, in my situation – it DID work out.
Now, to answer your question could someone make a wrong decision and get themselves in a bad situation? Yes, they could. Could there be major negative impacts of those situations? Yes, there could. That is one reason that we better have the absolute best people we have on these TETs. It is”PHD” level warfare at its best. We have to have “Geo-Political-Warriors” on these TETs. Another point here is this: My situation took place in early 03…back when Afghanistan was the “wild, wild west”…the environment is much more “mature” now and we know a lot more about who is who and what the situation is on the ground. The TETs going in today will know so much more information than we did in 03. The chances of a mistake being made like you describe are almost nil. Atleast initially. Much analysis and thought will be put into which tribe we will support and why.
Secondly, this type of strategy will help in both the goals that you talk about…Your “limited, defined” goal is, I believe a much bigger plus than you may think it is. Your “larger, ill-defined effort” goal is, at this point, a difficult task. Engaging the tribes, as my paper points out is only one of the many variables that have to be dealt with for us to be successful. I am the first person to admit that in arming and supporting the tribes, for the sake of security, that will make some of the other variables change. Some in the positive and some in the negative. I do however, stand by my belief that getting security for the people (tribes) is by far the most important and hardest part of any overall COIN fight. TETs and the use of a tribal engagment strategy (TES) are just part of an overall effort that I believe would have a positive impact in the overall strategic picture in the region.
I will answer your last question, with a question. Is it a fact that the “Afghan central governement” is corrupt and dysfunctional?’
Which has a better chance of succeding:
1. A strong, democratically elected government who governs the people of Afghanistan in a positve, pro-active manner?
2. Or some type of “loose confederation of tribes and ethnic backgrounds” that govern themselves and deal with the “central government” when necessary?
Thanks again for posting. I enjoyed getting a chance to answer your questions. It is great for me to have to think about and then verbalize concerns and questions like yours.
Thank you for moving the debate forward in a positive manner and I look forward to more posts from you in the future.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
jim gant a big fat turd.
jim gant is a big old turd!
jim gant. what can i say? your a turd. i have spent some time with him, and boy is this guy full of himself. this guy doesnt give a shit about his oda. all for self jim gant.
a gut from the coure,
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
I find Major Gant’s article to be the most impressive to date with regards to arguing a workable strategy towards nation-building for Afghanistan, the land of my birth. As a brief to my background, I along with the rest of my family migrated out of Afghanistan in the late seventies as a direct consequence of the PDPA coup, which in effect signaled the downward spiral of the nation as we knew it. Although Afghanistan was never a modern nation state as we in Liberal Democracies expect one to be, the rulers of the land however enjoyed overwhelming legitimacy from the common man in Afghanistan. The right to represent the Afghan nation centrally (and symbolically), dates back about 250 years when a tribal leader named Ahmed Shah Abdali, was raised to the Afghan throne as a king by a tribal council in Kandahar, apparently because he was the least argumentative compared to all the other alternatives who were present. Hence it can be argued here that he was viewed to be the least threatening to the perceived liberties (Afghan style) of those who invested in him as the new leader of Afghanistan.
Most people find it hard to believe when I try and impress upon them that preceding the PDPA coup and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the relationship between a burgeoning Afghan state and the Afghan people it sought to represent was significant. As my old father mentioned to me not long ago, a dispute between two parties to a loan for instance, was easily resolved by a lone policeman, without a bullet in his belt, walking up a hill to the home of the person liable for repaying his loan to honor his agreement. Moreover, when the state engaged in the provision of its modest infrastructure projects, the leaders of the day made sure to secure the consent of tribal leaders. To give you a real example, when roads were to be built through tribal territories, representatives of the state would visit a recalcitrant tribal leader, offer him a key to his own car, and subsequently securing his permission to build a road across his territory for others as well as his own convenience. This type of governing in Afghanistan not only secured stability for the country, but is also ensured a rising and healthy trend towards a benign nationalism. That not much of that old nationalism is obvious in rural Afghanistan today, has everything to do with the battering it received during decades of relentless warfare, wherein both the Soviets and Pakistanis alike sought to actively marginalize and subdue Afghan nationalism under the weight of their internationalist Communist or Islamist proxies.
Although Afghanistan’s history is long, for the purpose of this brief commentary however, we might be better served to start from the late nineteenth century Afghan ruler, Amir Abdurrehman Khan. Though history books often regard him as the “iron Amir”, it was however during his reign that symbols of the modern Afghan state began to emerge, along with early developments in public schooling, road building (as modest as they were), an Afghan national army, and the emergence of a national culture. It was during this Amir’s reign that local music thrived in Afghanistan, appealing to all Afghans across tribes, as he encouraged musicians from India to migrate and enrich the national culture. Even the food in Afghanistan began to be centralized symbolically as national cuisines. To an outsider, this may all appear superficial, but to Afghans who appreciate their cross-tribal music and food, these were the foundations of an emerging Afghan nationhood away from tribalism, which was cemented further by a long history of collective Afghan resilience to foreign tyrannies. Unlike Pakistan next door, which emerged as a state out of a colonial experience and over lands that are unmistakably Afghan and Indian, the Afghan nation on the other hand emerged as a natural collaboration and interaction – either by crook or by force – between various actors among the Afghan people. Whereas Pakistan is a failing state with no nation to back it, Afghanistan on the other hand is currently a tribal nation without a state.
Ever since the reign of Amir Abdurrehman Khan, the nation’s gradual drift towards statehood along with a national self-awareness began sprouting, only to be challenged by two major insurgencies that overthrew the governments of their day, one being the reign of Amanullah Khan, and the other being the PDPA government half a century later. Both had a lot in common, in that each regime fancied itself as modernizers seeking to impose self-indulgent powers of the state over the immediate needs and yearnings of the common Afghan. Amanullah Khan’s regime, which is now ironically eulogized by President Karzai himself among many other secular Afghans, had indeed introduced some welcome changes to the national culture, though it was the overstretched arm of his government that ultimately ensured its own undoing. Whilst Amanullah Khan’s reign brought with it some remarkable changes such as the abolishment of slavery, the introduction of a national constitution, the banning of polygamous marriages and the preamble of the parliament as a novel institution into the country, it also however imposed immense state intervention into the private lives of people that would have found more favor in France or the new Soviet Union, than it did in Afghanistan. For instance, the abolishment of polygamous marriages also included a demand that required men already involved in such marriages to divorce their wives completely, irrespective of the damage this caused to families. Other state imposed mandates including the demand for people to shave off their beards and trade in their Afghan garbs for western suits, with these measures and more combining to foster an insurgency against what looked every bit as Afghanistan’s first experiment with the introduction of a Nanny state. The insurgency spread from Paktia to the northern parts of the country – with possible prodding by Colonial Britain – finally arriving at a climax with the overthrow of the Amania regime, with a nine month boot of anarchy henceforward ensuing until a new Afghan leader – Nadir Khan – came back to Afghanistan from Europe to raise another government that effectively restrained itself from overwhelming meddling in people’s private lives and with references to the people’s religious heritage thrown in. This reckless episode at modernizing the Afghan state merely repeated itself in the form of the Communist regime by the late seventies, with the repercussions far more violent and damaging than the first anti-state insurgency some half a century before it. So to be clear, two major insurgencies in the country over the span of one century were induced by the central government.
What Major Jim Gant proposes herein is a step back to basics, but with the potential to solidify a nation state in Afghanistan like never before. If Afghans can indeed be engaged at tribal level, this could in the decades ahead evolve into elected local councils. In today’s Liberal Democracies, I think it would be safe to conclude that most people tend to take for granted their local government, although at some point in the evolution of these states, political representation at local levels were a necessity to bridge the gap between the central authorities and the governing elite at the centre. If this framework for Afghanistan were to expand into “tribal confederacies” over time, then citizen representation can also reach out to grass-roots Provincial self-governance not too dissimilar to Federal state structures that still observe national level central authority that can only benefit from all this in the long term.
What I’m concerned about however is with the possibility that Major Gant’s proposal could potentially coexist with General McChrystal’s own proposal for a strategy that seeks to protect the nation’s 10 major population districts whilst US troops are largely defensive with a special focus on raising and training the Afghan security forces to a level that in future can defend the country against the myriad of regional meddlers, beginning with Pakistan. As I am not a military strategist of any persuasion, I cannot say if more or less troops would be able to protect and defend major population centres from mass violence and with rural Afghanistan left for the Special force Operatives. However, it would certainly be ideal if major population centres can be protected to save lives and provide a level of security that could invite investment and jobs respectively. If less troops can achieve this, then I would view this to be ideal.
Barekzai,
Sir, thank you so much for writing the blog. I am fascinated by your insight. I would love to speak with you directly, to learn from you and ask you some questions about what you have said…if you can find the time, please email me at spartan16 [at] hotmail [dot] com.
Thank you again for writing. I am looking forward to many discussions with you in the near future.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
By the way, check out what the old Amanullah Khan regime looked like almost a century ago:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8WjrkwgF88
Jim -
First of all, thanks for your continuing service. Second, thanks for thinking hard about it and offering advice how the U.S. could pursue our goals in Afghanistan more efficiently, effectively, and economically. Per others who have responded, the aspect of your recommended approach that concerns me the most is the part about aligning a team closely with one tribe. I’m glad it worked so well for your team. The problem will be when tribal leaders seek to use a team for agendas (such as encroaching on another tribe’s turf) that are not necessarily shared by the host government or the U.S. Even the “Ph.Ds” you call for will not always be able to discern all the political, commercial, tribal, family, and cultural forces at play. They will, after all, still be strangers in a strange (to us) land. This is more than a theoretical concern. I believe our forces have previously run into those problems, where, for example, air power was called down on men believed to be Taliban but who may have actually been only men from a rival tribe.
The aspect I agree most with was how your team connected to the leaders of a key village. We should do more of that (though by starting small and planting the seeds in optimal ground). As others have pointed out, this is how most A-teams operated in Vietnam. They had to in order to survive and to accomplish their other missions. It has been my impression that most ODAs in Afghanistan at the time yours was there, and at least for a few years thereafter, got away from that, in accordance with guidance from above. Their missions were more kinetic, which would mean that the way your team operated was more the exception than the rule. Is that also your impression? Anyway, is SF now going more in the direction you advocate?