You are absolutely correct. There are many instances of soldiers in recent times being more adept at frontier statecraft than professional diplomats or elected officials. How could it be otherwise when some of the state department folks I met in Anbar argued passionately that the tribal ethos much less tribes or tribalism as a social organizing principle was an anachronism? This is nothing new. I venture to say that a Roman commander along the Rhine was more adept at tribal statecraft and diplomacy than a diplomat dispatched from Rome to the frontier to negotiate a truce.

Socrates’ admonition that “the unexamined life is not worth living” is well worth considering here as we execute military operations along the frontier. His admonition is not a clarion call to question authority but to inquire and understand the reasons why we think and act the way we do.

Why would the U.S. military embrace our current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine without questioning the validity of social engineering? The U.S. military’s approach to COIN is rooted in the nineteenth century idea of creating a more organized and rationalistic society. The American progressive movement consisted of political and social reformers who sought to harness the new forces of social organization for the betterment of society. Central to late nineteenth century progressivism was the notion that informed and enlightened professionals could improve society from the top down by applying their specialized knowledge to create more rational and efficient institutions. Progressivism’s philosophy of government by enlightened experts’ fit nicely with the U.S. military’s brand of benevolent paternalism. This philosophy has evolved into today’s versions of modernization, political and economic development theories. Our highly touted population-centric COIN approach is an attempt at a technical blueprint to impose a philosophy of governance deeply rooted in the ideals of the progressive movement of the late nineteenth century.

There is a general consensus among coalition partners that the state has three core functions: providing security, representation and welfare (through providing and/or redistributing wealth). Reconstituting or establishing a state’s capacity in these areas is seen to provide a state with legitimacy. If a state is unable to execute these functions and has limited legitimacy then it is either ‘fragile’, or has ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’. This definition merges both Locke’s social contract component and Weber’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force component.

I am not sure whether the locals in Afghanistan share in the consensus. It appears that the new social contract in Afghanistan does not stipulate that the Taliban must stop behaving like Pashtuns have behaved historically or to accept Weber’s insistence that the central government is obligated to dispute by force the sovereignty of autonomous communities.

We have been sold a bill of goods by the proponents of a kindler-gentler, social work approach to warfare. These magic beans ain’t sprouting. No matter how you slice the onion, population centric COIN is a means to impose our will upon an opponent. It is a strong arm tactic to renegotiate the social contract. The COINISTAS are peddling a technical blueprint for social engineering in which well meaning soldiers and Marines bestow upon a grateful society a number of social, political and economic reforms designed to produce a more efficient and honest government and a more modern, rational, and organized society. Not that there is anything wrong with that as long as we are honest with ourselves about what we are doing. I, on the other hand, question whether the social-work approach to warfare actually works. It hasn’t before, why now?

Major Gant’s approach is indeed a more philosophically sound approach to Foreign Internal Defense (FID) along the frontier. It is FID when we assist a foreign government in containing or defeating an insurgency, insurrection or rebellion. It is COIN if we have to fight against an insurrectionist movement inside the U.S. I’ll stick with COIN so as not to confuse the issue.

COIN on the frontier is a very personal affair. You describe U.S. military leaders as warlords or strongmen. It is a valid description. Success along the frontier depends on the local commander’s ability to effectively engage and communicate intent to the local community. If he speaks with authority and governs like a benevolent patron and acts in ways the people understand and respect then the community might transfer its allegiance to him. Not because of grandiose notions of a modern, social organization or more rational governance but because he is someone that will protect friends and punish enemies.

“…the key tenet of COIN/FID is to effectively communicate intent within the target audiences’ cultural frame of reference.”

You ask if we are sending the wrong message to our soldiers and Marines. Yes and No. I believe we need to strip away some of the myth surrounding our approach to COIN/FID. If we are going to force a change in the social contract in Afghanistan, so be it, but let’s be honest with ourselves and the locals. All true revolutions are bullying affairs, and forcing a society to renegotiate its social contract is revolutionary. We are uncomfortable with expressing raw power, and therefore seek to soften the image by manipulating the narrative for popular consumption, but our soldiers and Marines need to know the difference between myth and reality. This is a function of education vice indoctrination.

Training tribal engagement teams shouldn’t be very difficult. First, we would have to strip away a number of myths concerning COIN/FID. The training would entail introducing members to differing mental models for describing the motivations of local decision-makers. Based on how decisions are formed, we can recognize behavioral patterns. Team members would be introduced to “cultural operating codes and coordinating messages” as a framework for structuring analysis. This would allow team members to recognize socio-cultural patterns, provide an appreciation for how these patterns form and evolve over time and in-roads to shape the behavior.

We need to understand the rules that govern behavior or you can’t play the game.

v/r
MAC

Sorry to double-post, but found this incredibly interesting. An excerpt from the Army’s forthcoming publication on the history of Enduring Freedom, “A Different Kind of War”:

“An important distinction here is the difference between state formation and state failure. It is not that a nation-state never evolved in Afghanistan; rather, most scholars view the country as a failed state whose infrastructure has been destroyed or rendered ineffective by war and other disasters. As M. Nazif Shahrani explained, “The primary reason for the failure has been the unwillingness or inability of the leadership to shift from a tribal political culture anchored in person-centered politics to a broader, more inclusive, participatory national politics based on the development of modern national institutions and ideologies.” Despite their universalist message, the Taliban refused to stop behaving like Pashtuns historically acted– they embodied a tribal hegemony that has scorned other tribes and traditions, and failed to reach out to broaden their base of support. ”

Per our previous discussion, it seems the authors are indicating that the reason Afghanistan is in its current, deplorable, status is that it never found a way to embrace a “modern” (read, western modern) political system. Are we teaching our people the wrong message?

Just finished digesting your last response in our previous exchange (interview pt. 1) and this one. I can’t tell you how much humor and comfort I took in your stories about governmental agency representatives and the people who made accusations of you. It’s good to know you’re not the lone ranger some days.

I think it’s worth noting, in the context of your anecdotes, history’s many instances of soldiers proving themselves to be adept statesmen than the elected officials. The wisdom in the treaty developed by Johnston and Sherman, the policies and politics of Marshall and Eisenhower, and the sage advice of Colin Powell all indicate the potential for accomplishment if the right commanders are found and educated.

There are many proponents of divorcing the military from the responsibilities of managing the multiple functions of “nation-building” on the grounds that it is an instrument built to do two things– break things and kill people. I happen to agree with this faction, but only because others in our political and military leadership have set up a system which defies the principles you outline.

I believe a major reason we pulled defeat from the jaws of victory in Iraq in 2003 was that, regardless of the numerical strength of our forces, we deprived them of diplomatic “tribal” power. Leaders didn’t have fundamental knowledge of tribal organization or lines of operation and our post-invasion strategy for the first six months after units achieved steady state operations was focused on terrain and fixed sites. Worst of all, the military’s roles and responsibilities were partnered/subordinated/adjacent to the Coalition Provisional Authority. The confusion within the CPA itself resulting from Bremer’s replacement of Garner further muddled the situation. Within 12 months we had constructed a system as confusing to the Iraqis as the one they’d taken centuries to build was to us.

I believe, in that regard, we dilluted the power and prestige earned by the military during the invasion. Whatever respect we’d garnered through “shock and awe” was suddenly eroded. Though the arrival of the suits was primarily confined to Baghdad, there was a trickle-down effect. The huge stores of cash found in Saddam’s palaces became the guinea pig for the CERP fund program, but the method by which money was distributed, even at the battalion level, was stricly regimented and supervised. It was evident to every Iraqi sheikh and contractor who observed the procedure that the local company and battalion commanders was taking his cues from someone else. Our legitimacy was dilluted.

When I first arrived in Northern Iraq, we had yet to commit any faux pas or atrocity on the order of Abu Ghraib or Mahmudiyah. Everyone regarded us with utmost respect– so much so that at times we had to explain to the locals we weren’t as omnipotent as they thought. General Petraeus described this as the “moon man perception”. We put a man on the moon, so fixing their country would be a snap for us. Technological superiority and accomplishing in 100 days what the Iranian horde couldn’t do in eight years aside, the Iraqis had a certain perception of us– we were warlords.

I don’t bat the term around lightly or cynically. The Iraqis were incredibly comfortable with the idea of being governed by warlords. Many of them derived a sense of security from it. We had kicked out Saddam and his army, occupied the old bases and conducted patrols throughout the cities and towns. To them, it logically followed that one power broker was gone and a new one had replaced him. If you needed to get something done in the new Iraq, you went to the warlords.

Then their frustrations began. Why was progress on a Tal Afar construction project limited by a $500-a-week budget? Because the company commander only gets $500 from the battalion commander. Well then why don’t you go tell the battalion commander to increase the funds so we can get these powerlines fixed? Because the battalion commander is mandated to only give $500 a week to this project. Who mandated this? The General in Mosul. Why did the General do that? Because that’s what the man in the suit in Baghdad said to. So it was that, as we became frustrated that every village and tribe required a different approach, the Iraqis became frustrated that we demanded a single, uniform approach. Doubly aggravating was that, for the first year, not even the Americans knew how their own system worked.

That’s why I believe Major Gant’s approach is a more philosophically sound approach to COIN. It allows commanders on the ground to become warlords. Their immediate source of firepower is the local partnered tribe, and they have the add-on of whatever happens to be listening to their radio frequency. But the biggest punch is in what you describe above. The power, prestige, and respect accorded to a warlord commander remains intact. Placed further out on his own, there is no higher headquarters constantly looking over a warlord’s shoulder.

However, as I’ve expressed concern about before and you detail here, managing all that power and prestige is complicated. I’m not sure the average infantry company commander is armed with the proper education to do it successfully.

We’ve discussed helping the men on the ground here. I’d like to know what your opinion is on just how much training, in general principles and cultural specifics, would one of Major Gant’s Tribal Engagement Team leaders need to be effective in the context of the “shame and honor spectrum”?

Our soldiers and Marines are indeed dealing with folks that are “separated by 5 miles and a thousand years”. There are places in the world where the past, present, change and continuity coexist in the same social space. Our political and military strategy must incorporate this condition.

Another reason our initiatives in Anbar province worked as well as they did was because we were dealing with tribes that were all members of the Dulaym Confederation. This is not the case in Helmand province or eastern Afghanistan where confederations comparably to the one we dealt with in Anbar do not exist.

Trying to make sense of the myriad alliance relationships and dealing with numerous competing aqwam (solidarity groups) is indeed “time intensive, energy intensive, and tiring”. It takes much patience, persistence and time with time a critical resource in short supply.

Thanks for your post.

v/r
MAC

Instead of trying to fit a centralized square peg in a round decentralized whole, why not just adopt different strategies to fit each area? It’s really not that difficult; if Village A wants governance, and Village B wants economics…we provide what’s necessary.

The biggest difference between ops in Iraq and Afghanistan is the distance. In Ramadi, or the other cities, you had different tribes on different blocks, so what worked in with ‘A’ likely worked with ‘B’. In A’stan A and B might be seperated by 5 miles and a thousand years; the current ISAF idea of centralization and standardization is a guarantee of failure and more unnecessary American deaths.

I’ve watched the Marines do it in Helmand. It’s time intensive, energy intensive, and tiring. But it works.

Thanks for the plug.

You are absolutely correct; each village, valley, and / or region requires its own campaign plan. The idea that we might actually need separate campaign plans for every village, valley, or region has been difficult to accept especially since we tend to favor centralization and governing from the center.

The best that we might achieve in an area of operation is a coalition of villages prepared to defend against or to attack militant formations as they penetrate the defensive network. Creating and managing coalitions is critical. Successful strategy is successful politics.

v/r
MAC

A major difference to A’stan, however, is that Ramadi had Sheik Sattar stand up (Sept 2006) and embrace the Marines. Their mutual success – earned at the cost of the lives of Marines in 1st Bn, 6th Marines, conferred a legitmacy on their efforts that gave the other tribes in Anbar the courage to join them. There’s not yet a local chief in A’stan with Sattar’s courage, which slows the process considerably.

2 MEF (Fwd) is getting cooperation in Helmand, Nimroz, and Farah, but on a village-by-village basis – which is a huge agricultural area, slows the process considerably. The small ANA-Marines bases of 5-7 Marines and 15-20 ANA (similar to OP Va, OP Hawk, OP Khatanna in Ramadi) remain the most effective tactics to date as it lets the local chiefs govern in relative safety.

There’s far less success in the east where the Army is reluctant to get out of their MRAPS and actually talk to the locals, plus they keep pushing the benefits of the Karzai government, which the locals know is clearly a joke. Tip O’Neal would have understood Afghan politics; “all politics is local”, the problem being that ‘local’ in Afghanistan is river valley – by river valley, and village – by- village. ‘One size’ does not fit all here !