Do you ever get to Florida – the Vero Beach – Ft. Pierce area in particular ? If so, you might be interested in visiting the National Navy UDT-SEAL Museum. If you are, let me know and I can send you a free ticket (as Pres., it is one of the few things I have authority to do).

With best regards,

Willard

No… thank you for taking the time to engage in this conversation.

You are right. There was something missing from the previous thread. What was missing in the conversation concerning the relationship between the Commander and Intelligence Officer was a conversation concerning mental models. In my opinion, mental models describe events and provide meaning to cause and effect relationships. Mental models filter information and influence our approach to problem solving. Problem solving requires analysis. Analysis is the process of asking and answering questions. Mental models influence the types of information we require to plan and execute an operation and the specific questions that will be asked to gain this information.

Thanks,

r/
MAC

I only brought up SF because I didn’t see any mention of it in all of the Commander and S-2 references. Also, as I had no knowledge of either your or Major Gant’s background in SpecOps, I didn’t want make an unwarranted presumption. I just hesitate to presume that the SF role is automatically understood and considered – particularly when dealing with EEI (probably an obsolete term).

Thank you for taking your time and your considerate reply.

With best regards,

Willard

Thank you very much for your post.

Why do you believe that the input of the Special Forces community is being ignored? Major Gant is a Special Forces operator. I personally draw upon my experiences in the special operations community and Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai is a local.

Secondly, and this may sound a bit arrogant and so I apologize ahead of time, I believe that Major Gant, Chief Ajal Khan Zazai or myself are not so much grappling with the “issue” or the fog of misunderstanding. What we are grappling with is how best to share and convey our very personal insights with those that may not have experienced the place the way we did or are uncomfortable with describing the place in the way we do.

I have presumed to speak for others without their consent and therefore will accept any chastisement from Major Gant or Chief Ajal Khan Zazai if I have misrepresented their opinion on the matter.

v/r
MAC

I have the impression from reading your extensive comments that there is a lot of fog/misunderstanding in the air. There is a source for some of this (not a universal answer) that you are grappling with. I think you should also consider the SF (Specail Forces) input to the situation. They live with the individuals on the ground and their success, when they are properly used, speaks for itself. They are not SEALS with strike missions, but trained to win the hearts and minds of the local indigenous people they are with on a longer term basis. Whether Pashtuns in Iraq or “Yard” Tribesmen in Viet Nam, they understand the local structures, languages and relationships. They may be difficult to access, but should their potential input therefore be ignored ? I only bring this up because I did not see any mention of them in your discourses about intel and its requirements and the need to understand the local situation.

Respectfully,

Willard B. Snyder

While this more recent running set of essays on broader ME challenges but specifically including Afghanistan builds on that earlier work:
Middle East Solutions: Issues, Relationships, Frameworks and Approaches
Fair Warning – this is on a higher level perhaps than the discussion here so far but there may be a fed tidbits and pieces of machinery that are usable.
In any case I’m thrilled that these questions are getting such serious debate among smart and qualified people. Good luck to you all.

Thanks for the post.

In my opinion, the key tenet of irregular warfare is to effectively communicate intent, whether kinetically or non-kinetically, within the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.

The mental model describes how the social system behaves and why. In irregular warfare, every activity, such as isolate, disrupt, capture, secure, recruit or train sends a political message. An appreciation for the how and why of social behavior supports the development of appropriate operational and tactical tasks.

An appreciation for segmentation or the tendency of all groups to engage in alliance and coalition building and patronage as a means to bind groups in alliance relationships, could link directly to the operational and tactical tasks of isolate (alliance network), disrupt (sever patronage relationship), secure, recruit and train.

A tactical task in support of isolating or disrupting an alliance network may be to “secure” stretch of trade route from point A to point B. Merchant families and local land owners enter into relationships (alliances) with those able to provide security (security is a commodity). Unable to collect security taxes, local insurgents are unable to attract followers creating an opening for a group of our choosing (recruit and train) to occupy the function of security provider (patronage, territory).

v/r
MAC

I’m interested in seeing this conversation go one step farther. How does the mental model relate to tactical tasks? How do I stop missions like clear, capture, kill, disrupt and replace them with find, recruit and train? And I don’t mean find caches, instead, find the local sheikhs, mullahs, and other power holders. I’d also point out that training isn’t on a range, it’s conducting joint patrols with local militia, etc.

If you really think about it, what is the tactical task used with the highest percentage in Afghanistan? When I was in Iraq in 06-07 it was disrupt AIF almost every time. In my opinion, the only way we are going to truly challenge the Taliban is by focusing on the same people they seek to murder and intimidate. That will only happen if our company level units are tasked to do so. In my mind, that means forgetting about CG, CV, because they are focused on the enemy. An enemy who is unseen until he chooses otherwise.

I guess my question is this, how does the mental model translate into a method of tasking? Or does it only seek to identify?