SP: Chief Zazai, I’d like to talk to you today on the subject of Pakistan. More than any other aspect of the Afghan conflict, I think, the subject of Pakistani involvement is confusing to Americans. Even extremely well-versed observers ask, “Whose side is Pakistan on?” You, more than anyone I know, are in a position to really “tell it like it is.” So let me ask you first, what do you think is the Pakistani agenda in the current Afghan conflict? What does the government of Pakistan want?

Chief Zazai, right, during the 90s, with his father, Chief Azfal Khan Zazai, and his father's bodyguard

Chief Zazai: When you talk about the government of Pakistan, do you mean 1) the Bureaucrats, 2) the Elected Government, 3) the Army or 4) the Shadowy powerful invisible government? In Pakistan a few governments exist. First, the bureaucrats who are there no matter who comes into power; then the elected government; then the Army government, which is most superior and above all which comes and goes whenever they feel like; and finally the Shadowy government of former ISI officers and some former Army Generals whom you do not see but surely feel their presence.

If you take all four Pakistani governments (which function simultaneously), I believe their single agenda would be the survival of Pakistan as a country. Pakistan has one enemy and that is India. Unless India and Pakistan come to the point where they can free themselves of the Cold War mentality and enmity with each other, things will be tense in the region for many years to come.

In respect to Afghanistan, I believe the first three Pakistani governments would wish for a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan with more Pakistani influence. But the shadowy government, which has its own agenda and designs, would go a few steps further by continuing to operate their proxies (insurgents) in order to keep Afghanistan destabilized and weak. I believe the Shadowy Pakistani government also wishes to see less or even no Indian influence and interference in Afghanistan and of course it wishes to see a large share given to the anti-Indian Taliban in the Afghan government.

SP: I have heard Pakistan described as “an army in search of a state.” Do you think there’s any truth to that? Perhaps more specifically, what is the role of Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, in the overall government of Pakistan? Why is this one branch so powerful?

Chief Zazai: Let’s put it this way, the ISI is an institution which runs Pakistan. No one should doubt the ability and the power the ISI has. I believe it is the region’s most superior intelligence agency. The ISI enjoyed a large portion of the $28 billion that came in from the West during the 80’s in support of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. Throughout this period they have advanced their abilities and training.

I do not believe there is any truth to the phrase, “an Army in search of a State.” Pakistani institutions are all functioning well; the Army is strong and in control. I believe Pakistan can not survive without its Army either. The Shadowy government might be in alliance with the Army but that contact would be limited to a number of individuals and not the entire Pakistani Army.

One might ask, if the Shadowy government is not entirely supported by the Pakistani Army, then where do they get their support? There is no solid evidence to back this claim, but there are many reports that Iran, Russia and China are pouring a lot of money into this Shadowy government to support the Taliban in Afghanistan. If this is true, it means the problem is much wider. It is a regional issue.

Chief Zazai in anti-Soviet days

Afghanistan has been always the center of the so-called “Great Game.” I strongly believe the Great Game is on now. One should be smart enough to play the game right, which means the US and NATO are now fully in the great game. If they play it wrong, they will lose and if they play it smart they will win, it’s that simple!

SP: Let’s revisit recent history for a moment, to help us understand how we got to where we are today. During the mujahideen era, the Pakistani government and the ISI were America’s allies in helping to funnel arms and money to the Afghan fighters (including yourself and your father) who were resisting the Soviet occupation. The ISI in essence created the Taliban, did they not? How did we get from then to now?

Chief Zazai: I want to clear one thing up here that is neither I nor my father ever got a single bullet or a single dollar from the ISI. My father always refused to contact or get involved with the ISI from day one (1980) due to his personal views. Most of the arms our men had were captured from the Russians and from the Afghan Communists, plus my father was receiving some cash on a regular basis from most Afghan businessmen in Afghanistan and his friends in the West in order to continue the fight against the Red Army. My father and myself were never in the payroll of the ISI. This fact is clear like the shining sun to every Afghan who knows my father and myself. That was one reason my father could not expand the tribal unity beyond Zazi Valley.

SP: My apologies, Chief Zazai. You and I are still getting to know each other!

Chief Zazai: Of course the Taliban were created by the Shadowy Pakistani government (ISI). Even President Karzai was part of the Taliban movement in their initial days.

When the Red Army was defeated, Washington turned its back on Afghanistan and Pakistan and left everyone in the cold to freeze! I guess that did not impress Pakistan in general.

Chief Zazai in custody of the Pakistani government

SP: Chief Zazai, you yourself were imprisoned by the ISI in Pakistan for two and a half years, without any charges ever being brought. Can you tell us briefly the story behind this? How do you feel about this experience? Has it left you embittered and an enemy of Pakistan?

Chief Zazai: When people say, “There is neither friend nor foe in politics,” the living example can be seen in Pakistan. I am not an enemy of Pakistan and never have been. Our campaign in 1997 (my father’s and mine) was to start a resistance in Afghanistan against the brutal regime of Taliban, not against the Pakistani governments. But because the shadowy government in Pakistan was embedded with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, it did not allow us to go any further. Most Pakistani politicians including the present President Asif Ali Zardari have been imprisoned at one time or another, sometimes for years, on countless charges. Now he is the president of his country and ruling the same government that once put him in prison! I do not think he is to take revenge on Pakistan nor is he an enemy of Pakistan.

The people of Pakistan are peace-loving and very friendly people. I have many Pakistani friends and family. I believe there is a rift within its Army in regard to these insurgents (Taliban), as many Pakistani Army Generals including General Kiyani want to put an end to this nonsense in Waziristan, Bara, Tirah Orakzai Agency and the Khyber & Mommand Agencies. But again the shadowy government is far stronger and more powerful than one could imagine and the Shadowy government would do anything to protect its proxies.

My father’s agenda and mine during the late 90s was to start an uprising against the Taliban regime in three South Eastern Provinces (Paktia, Paktika & Khost). In order to do so we needed to organize armed groups within the provinces and take charge of affairs on the district level. An incident happened in 1997 in which four Taliban members, including one Taliban commander, were killed in Paktia by my father’s commander. This sent alarming waves to the Taliban leadership and to the shadowy Pakistani government, which are the die hard supporters of that Taliban. Later that year my father’s commander was killed along with six of his fighters in Paktia in a trap set by the Taliban.

The Shadowy Pakistani government did not allow any movement against the Taliban within Pakistani soil. Our biggest disadvantage was that we had no choice but to use Pakistani soil to gain support in order to carry out operations within Afghanistan. That was not a move which could be tolerated by the Pakistani Shadowy government of ISI.

Prior to my arrest, a few of my father’s close friends and allies were also imprisoned. They were snatched from their homes and were taken to undisclosed locations and held there for months. Their families were unaware of their whereabouts but when their whereabouts were found, all three were charged with terrorism.

I was the liaison between London and my father. I was snatched too from my family home in Peshawar and put in prison with false charges to bring pressure on my father to stop the movement. They accused us of working for the Northern Alliance. I was denied a trial and kept in prison until 2001. All the charges were dropped against me and I was set free in early 2002 as I was no longer a threat.

In my opinion, prison is a learning experience. I learned a lot and read a lot and I believe prison is the only institution where one learns all by himself. As my father used to tell me that “An iron needs a lot of fire to become a good sword.” I am not happy that I was in prison, but I learned a lot about life, politics and how to survive in a very tense environment full of pressures. I am glad it’s over!

[This discussion ran longer than anticipated, so we'll break it into two parts and publish the second one next week. To be continued: our interview with Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai on the subject of Pakistan and how its actions and policies affect the current situation in Afghanistan. See you next Friday!]

[The blog is "on the road" this week.  Here is a re-run of the most clicked interview so far.  See you next week!]

Welcome back, Chief Zazai, after last week’s break in our ongoing, multi-part interview. As you know, we took that space last week to post an open letter to Gens. Jones, Petraeus, McChrystal and Adm. Mullen, alerting them to your formation of a Tribal Police Force in the Zazi Valley and asking for help in aligning that force with the American troops (10th Mountain Division) whose Area of Operations (AO) includes your district. Respect for confidentiality prevents me from publishing particulars, but I’m happy to say that we got an immediate response and that it was just what we hoped for. The top U.S. commanders are listening. More on that as it develops– and as confidentiality permits. Now back to our talk!

Tribal elders gathering this summer in Zazi to organize a Tribal Police Force

SP: Chief Zazai, we were talking about warlords last time. We hear the word “corruption” a lot in news reports in the States, referring to the Kabul government–and how that alienates the people from the U.S. effort. Can you tell us what specific forms corruption takes? Give us a picture from the regular person’s point of view.

Chief Zazai: You are a trucker who is delivering a load of goods from Kabul to Herat. What happens? Along the road there are checkpoints, some of “police,” some you don’t know who they are. Each time you must pay. You are held up at gunpoint. Or you may own a shop and you’re doing well. One day they arrest you and take you to jail. Or you or your son is snatched off the street. Your family must pay a ransom to get you back. Do you want a license to build a building or permission to dig a well or put in a pipe for sewage? Everywhere you find outstretched hands.

SP: Who is doing this?

Chief Zazai: It is the police, it is the army, it is agents of the warlords who run their districts and deliver votes to the Kabul government. And when the people believe that the U.S. is backing these people, you can see what that does.

SP: Not to mention what the people endure from the Taliban.

Chief Zazai: The people are caught between two fires. When the warlords ran Afghanistan after the Soviets got kicked out, a poor person had to pay a “tax” to have a bicycle, to buy rice, if you sneezed they took money out of your pocket. The Taliban arose in response to this and were backed by the people who thought, These guys are bad but at least they are honest. At least they believe in something beyond their own greed and gangsterism. But then the Taliban became just as much of a plague upon the people by jamming their cruel ways down everybody’s throat. And we saw what Mullah Omar let happen, culminating on 9/11.

SP: Your idea of Tribal Police Forces and a Tribal Alliance aims to counter both warlordism and Talibanism. Is that right?

Chief Zazai: Instead of an official government that is “warlord-centric” or a Shadow government that is “Taliban-centric” (which is what my country is suffering under now), what will work is a form of governance that is tribal-centric. The tribal system is the natural form of governance in Afghanistan and has been for thousands of years. And the U.S. will not achieve anything until it understands this.

The Afghan tribes wish for this cooperation and partnership with the U.S. Forces. Afghan villagers do not like to see U.S. forces going into a village and searching the houses of ordinary people who have nothing to do with the Taliban, and they are sick and tired of the Taliban who are forcing these villagers and tribesmen for their needs which are water, food, money and safe houses. When cooperation gets going, the Afghan tribes will have an understanding with the U.S. forces. I believe this will bring not just a positive impact but a deep rooted relationship between the two nations (the United States of America & Afghanistan).

SP: We had a comment last week from “Gene,” wondering what the greater vision was for your Tribal Police Force program. Clearly in your mind such a program is just a first step. How do you see it expanding?

Chief Zazai: The vision is to expand the TPF programme from one tribe to many tribes and from one district to the whole country. But as I said earlier, we have got to do it right which means starting it in one district and proving it can work, then expanding it to other districts by signing treaties with the tribes and allowing the tribes to sign treaties among each other so they can prevent future disputes among themselves. Such a programme can grow from a province to a province. It is absolutely still possible to do it and I believe the U.S. policy makers and top generals should get down to business and take this approach seriously now.

SP: The process, as you see it, would be a cooperative effort between the tribes and the U.S. government?

The 11 Tribes' meeting was broadcast on Afghan channel Shamashad for three days

Chief Zazai: Yes. It must start bottom-up, from the grass roots, as I have done in my valley by organizing a Tribal Police Force of 80 men. We had 2000 people volunteer for this! So it can grow and it should. And, as I said, when our tribal meeting was broadcast on the Afghan TV channel, Shamashad (which it was for three days), we got many, many responses from tribal leaders all over Afghanistan wishing to join.

SP: Skeptics of course will say that to arm the Afghan tribes would only be adding another ungovernable element to an already-seething witches’ brew of contending forces. How would you answer that objection?

Chief Zazai: I absolutely can understand the point where many minds’ red light alerts goes off, but that again is due to the lack of understanding of the Afghan tribal structure. Back in the 18^th and 19^th Centuries the British Raj faced similar problems and the threats were immediately felt by London. In order to stop the Afghan tribes from crossing into the greater Indian side and destabilizing the British Raj, the British created tribal forces from the Afghan tribes to defend the territory of the British Raj in what is now the (NWFP) North West Frontier Province. That strategy worked so well that the British models of Khyber Rifles, Mommand Regiments and Frontier Constabulary have become legendary forces and all are made from the tribesmen and are still part of the today’s Pakistani armed forces.

SP: As I understand it, these British-officered forces were, in practical terms at the rank-and-file level, governed by tribal constraints and conventions.

Chief Zazai: Militia do not exist in the frame of the tribal structure, we have got Arbakai, which means Tribal Police or Tribal Armed Constables. As I said before, the Tribal Police Force programme is and will be under the total control of a Tribal Council. The elders will control the force, there shall be no problems at all because we have a strong tribal system that no individual can break the treaties these elders make. What the elders promise, they will do and deliver. It will be more depending on the U.S. Army to deliver what they promise. To prevent tribal conflict, it has to be structured in such a way that all the tribes living in one province will sign Unity treaties among each other and agree on the conditions laid out. This would be expanded to the neighboring provinces as well, that’s where we will be able to unite the Afghan Tribes and bring them all under a single leadership. I have done so in my valley with the 11 Tribes. It’s a small-scale achievement but it could be applied all over and enlarged.

SP: What did you think of Gen. McChrystal’s recent report to President Obama? Do his recommendations fit in with the program that you have started and are championing?

Chief Zazai: I have my agreements with Gen. McChrystal’s report and my disagreements. Let me talk first about my agreements. It is interesting to learn that Gen. McChrystal has identified all the wounds, i.e. the corrupt Kabul regime, lack of cooperation between NATO countries, lack of knowing the main goal of being there and so forth. What I disagree with is the tune of his views presented in the media. I mean using negative words like “failure.” This is red meat to the enemy’s propaganda machine and believe me they are good. I hear this often that the Taliban leaders are encouraging their field commanders to fight harder as the elephant is now grounded and all we have to do is to slaughter the elephant, meaning America is now on its knees and a few more hard pushes and they are out. This contributes a great deal to the morale of our enemies. I understand that words like this must be used for internal U.S. political reasons, to wake the people up and show them how difficult the task is. But I would suggest the U.S. top military generals be cautious issuing such statements as this has its severe impacts and impressions.

SP: What are your thoughts on the U.S. sending more troops?

Chief Zazai: To send more troops means to create more new battles, I think we have already got a few nasty fronts in the south where the British soldiers and U.S. Marines are fighting almost non-stop and of course more troops means more body bags and that itself would be an alarming sign. In Vietnam the U.S. had over half a million soldiers and still the generals were asking for more. I would suggest that Gen. McChrystal instead explore better alternatives on the ground rather than asking for more troops. I agree when he is asking for resources and equipment and here I present the Tribal Police Force for his attention–to consider the TPF as an alternative to more U.S. troops.

I am not saying that the TPF members will take the place of the U.S. Army or Marines but the TPF will prove to be more efficient and more productive because these are the “soil men,” they know how to fight, they know the tough terrain and they can easily identify friends and foes, which the U.S. forces cannot do on their own. By getting the backing and the support of the tribes, we will bring the insurgency down to 50%, cut all the routes of crossing from Pakistan, turn the local tribes against the insurgents to fight them, deny them shelter and food. This is the way to do it and the proper and the productive way. As we saw the large-scale fraud in this Presidential election, this is no way of bringing democracy or even convincing the Afghan nation to accept a President who is not more than a Mayor of Kabul and who only relies on powerful, brutal warlords just to survive.

SP: Thanks again, Chief Zazai, for giving us a view from the tribal perspective. We’ll continue next week. I want to ask you more about the psychology of tribes and how the tribal point of view is different from our Western way of thinking–and how this affects the U.S. military’s efforts to connect in a meaningful way with the tribes. Okay with you?

Chief Zazai: I will keep talking, Steve, as long as you want to keep asking questions!

[This week has been a rough one for our troops in Afghanistan--and a contentions one among policymakers here in the States.  I'm going to interrupt our ongoing interview with tribal chief Ajmal Khan Zazai to post this open letter.  The same note was sent by e-mail two days ago to the parties below.]

TO: Gen. James Jones, Adm. Michael Mullen, Gen. David Petraeus, Gen. Stanley McChrystal

FROM: Steven Pressfield

SUBJ: An opportunity in Afghanistan

Dear Gen. Jones,

I’m the author of Gates of Fire. I read in a newspaper interview a few years ago that Gates is your favorite book–and you and I have corresponded briefly by e-mail in the past. I cite this connection in the hope that it will give me enough credibility in your eyes that you’ll keep reading this note.

I want to draw your attention to a situation in a valley in Afghanistan that may afford an opportunity for real progress in the Afghan campaign. Please bear with me for a little background.

A pro-American Tribal Chief

For some months I’ve been writing a blog called “It’s the Tribes, Stupid.” Its address is http://blog.stevenpressfield.com. The thesis of the blog is aligned very much with Gen. Petraeus’ and Gen. McChrystal’s COIN strategy of “protect the people.” Recently I’ve been running a series on the blog–a multi-part interview with an Afghan tribal chief, Ajmal Khan Zazai of Paktia province. Chief Zazai holds the paramountcy of eleven tribes in the Zazi valley. He’s an extraordinary man. He and his father fought the Soviets in the 80s and the Taliban after that. Chief Zazai’s father was assassinated under orders from Mullah Omar; the chief himself has survived two attempts on his life.

Chief Zazai, right, with his father and bodyguard, both murdered in 2000.

Chief Zazai was educated in Canada; he’s an excellent English speaker and holds Canadian citizenship. He has been a champion for his people for decades; in fact right now he is in London meeting with Sir David Richards to try to further his country’s cause.

A grass roots anti-insurgent force

This past summer Chief Zazai formed a Tribal Police Force of 85 men. This is purely a grass roots effort, intended to protect the people of the valley and founded by the chief under his own initiative. He has been in contact with the 10th Mountain Division, whose Area of Operation is the Zazi valley; in fact elements of the division helped provide security this past July for the tribal council at which the TPF was organized. The chief’s earnest hope is to ally with U.S. forces, to share intelligence and to work together to “protect the people”–i.e., his eleven tribes–in the valley.

Zazi Valley, Afghanistan. The meeting place of 11 tribes this summer to organize a Tribal Police Force

Three weeks ago, the Tribal Police Force was attacked with an IED. The enemy (no one knows who) struck at a mosque where the unit was dining at the end of Ramadan. Just a couple of days ago, a second attack occurred on a road in the valley. So far, luck has held. No one has been seriously hurt.

If “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” then Chief Zazai and his tribal police are America’s friend. But they are in danger.

Thank God somehow the main bomb in the mosque did not go off [Chief Zazai wrote to me], if that had gone off, it could have killed as many as 30 to 40 people easily. The reason the insurgents planted this bomb is that they are aware we are siding with the US, just imagine if this bomb had gone off and killed this many people, do you really think I could have been in the position to form another such group? No, never.

A chance for COIN to work

Here’s what I’d like to put before you, Gen. Jones:

If you or Admiral Mullen or Gen. Petraeus or Gen. McChrystal could assign one aggressive young officer to look into this situation (and grant that officer access to you), I believe a real breakthrough could be made that might serve as a model for U.S.-Afghan cooperation.

A beginning this summer

We need some on-site person to bridge the gap between 10th Mountain Division commanders and Chief Zazai’s tribal police. As it stands right now, chain-of-command bureaucracy is deadly. If no action is taken, this opportunity will fizzle. This is a classic situation of How To Lose A War, if “business as usual” is allowed to prevail. We need a man on the spot. Somebody who can assess the situation and move for action up the food chain. Here’s a note from Chief Zazai yesterday:

I spoke to Wayne (Borders, the 10th Mountain Division commander in Ali Khell in the Zazi valley). There is not much he can do to help really, what I need is more resources, more support … Wayne is a great guy, he already expresses his total support and is 100% dedicated to help in any way he can, what he can do really is put some good words for the Programme to his superiors and I believe he has done so already.

The relationship is there, it’s building, what really is missing is lack of logistical support for my Tribal Police Force programme. With proper funding I will be able to have proper Intel teams and my night Working team who will look after these [bad] guys who have taken safe refuge in my Valley!

More than just one valley

I would not put this before you, Gen. Jones, if I didn’t think this particular situation bore enormous potential for expansion beyond just this one valley. When the eleven Zazi tribes met this summer,

… the Tribes were excited to take part in the gathering and this was seen widely throughout Afghanistan by many other tribes on Shamshad TV which broadcasted the event for 3 days and a momentum is now circulating around Afghanistan for a tribal united front which could find a way forward. My team in Kabul and Zazi have been contacted by many Tribal chiefs throughout Afghanistan who wish to join our efforts for uniting all the Afghan Tribes.

Chief Zazai’s father, before he was murdered, worked for years to unite the Afghan tribes–not only the Pashtuns, but the Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks and others. Now Chief Zazai himself is championing this cause.

Yes, this is only one man and only one valley. But the opportunity is real and so is the peril. If the next IED attack succeeds, this bottom-up effort could be snuffed out before it even gets going.

At a time when the U.S. Afghan mission is under tremendous pressure politically at home and under attack in the world press, here in Ali Khell in the Zazi Valley is a chance to “protect the people”; to ally with a passionate, articulate, pro-American Afghan patriot; and to link with a true grass roots movement that is on our side and only wants to help and work with us.

I can put you, or any officer you designate, in touch with Chief Zazai. Just respond in the Comments box below or write me at steve [at] stevenpressfield [dot] com.

Chief Zazai and I have been invited to speak in January at Marine Corps University; we will be at other venues and media outlets in Washington D.C. as well. But that is a long way away.

I salute you, Gen. Jones, and Adm. Mullen and Gen. Petraeus and Gen. McChrystal on giving your all to an incredibly daunting and complex task–one that has frustrated no less illustrious a personage than Alexander the Great (not to mention Cyrus the Great, Genghis Khan, Akbar the Great and the Brits and Russians) in the past.

Please consider what I have put before you here. Just one bright, assertive young officer could make an enormous difference if he were given latitude to act and direct access to you. Thanks and all my best …

Semper Fi,

Steven Pressfield

SP: Welcome back, Chief Zazai, for this second installment of our multi-part interview. As our readers know from last week, you are a paramount chief of eleven tribes in your home district, the Zazi Valley in Paktia province. Your father fought the Soviets and the Taliban and was assassinated in 2000; you yourself have fought those fights and have survived two recent attempts on your own life. It’s a pleasure and a privilege for me to be able to talk with you today.

Chief Zazai: Thank you, Mr. Pressfield, for affording me this opportunity to tell a side of the Afghan story that we see very little of in the American media.

Chief Zazai, second from right, and bodyguards on the way to Kabul to speak with the British ambassador

SP: Chief Zazai, I wanted to ask you today about how your Tribal Police Force is working with the American 10th Mountain Division, whose Area of Operations includes your home valley. But something else came up this week that I’ve got to ask you about first. It’s about warlords.

Chief Zazai: Steve, you may get an answer from me that you don’t like!

 SP: There was an article in the Washington Post last week by David Ignatius, a very good one, I thought. In it, Mr. Ignatius quotes a “former CIA officer” who seems to be advocating an approach that I believe you’d agree with, of working with “the locals,” by which he means (I think) the tribes. But then he refers to them, twice, as “the warlords.”

Chief Zazai: If a CIA officer can’t tell the difference between a Warlord and a Tribal Chief, then how would an ordinary American citizen? This is pure ignorance and it is sad to read such embarrassing stuff in the papers.

SP: What exactly is the difference between a tribal chief and a warlord? 

Chief Zazai: A tribal leader is elected by the tribes. A warlord is a self-imposed body on the tribes and the people. A tribal leader does not get elected if he has blood on his hands. A warlord cannot survive unless he has killed many innocent people, looted people’s livelihoods and been involved in the opium and drug trade. A tribal leader only gets elected when he, his father and grandfather have been servants of the community. A warlord does not need these recommendations. A warlord gains his position by force of arms and is only interested in personal gain. A warlord has no problem with reelection as this summer’s so-called election has shown. In this case the gun is mightier than the pen.

SP: So when you are talking about organizing Tribal Police Forces, you’re envisioning these as a counter-power to the warlords?

Chief Zazai: Yes, and to other forces—the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and insurgent forces. The tribes are Afghanistan. To say “the people,” you mean “the tribes.” But the tribes have been weakened terribly over time and are vulnerable to coercion and intimidation by armed, extremist (and warlord) forces. This is why it is so important for the American people to understand who their friends are. Without the tribes, the U.S. cannot win. And without help from the U.S., the tribes cannot protect themselves. 

SP: Tell us a little about how today’s warlords originally came to power. They literally ruled the country in the 80s, didn’t they, after driving out the Soviets and later destroying the Afghan communist government that the Russians left behind?

Chief Zazai: During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, seven or eight freedom-fighting groups were formed by the Pakistani military, mainly by the ISI. When the last regime of the Communist party (PDPA) was thrown out, these power-hungry men started a war against each other in order to get to the throne of Kabul. They used artillery and rockets against each other and turned Kabul into rubble. These brutal men continued their animal acts for a long five years, which resulted in the loss of 60,000 innocent men, women and children in Kabul alone. These men committed atrocities, kidnapped many young boys and girls, and looted people’s livelihoods.

SP: Where are these warlords now?

Chief Zazai: Where? They are running Afghanistan!

It is worse now because these same men have the muscle of the US and NATO behind them and full-fledged support when they wish to do something. These warlords are now kings and princes of Afghanistan. They can kidnap anyone for money and no one would ask them; they are in Mr. Karzai’s Cabinet, in his National Security Committee, in the Parliament; they have control in the Defense and Interior Ministries as well as the National Security Directorate, they are all over the governement and much to our surprise the International Community is treating these thugs and criminals as if they were world-class politicians.

Let me give you a straight answer here: Let’s suppose we bring guys like John Gotti and Al Capone and Scarface and make them Vice Presidents, National Security Advisors, Foreign Secretaries and members of the Congress and Senate in America. How would the American people feel about that?

SP: Let my ask you about power on the ground. What is the makeup of a typical warlord’s forces? Hekmatyar for example, and his party, Hezb-e Islami. Are they made up of tribes-as-tribes?

Chief Zazai: Absolutely not. As I said, most warlords used ethnic division for their own benefit back in the 90s when they were fighting each other to get to the throne of Kabul. The local tribes have no choice but to support these insurgent groups (the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, al-Qaeda, Uzbek and Tajik fighters) because these groups are always in the area and are brutal people. They have killed hundreds of tribal chiefs and driven many, many others off their land. Why? To weaken the tribal structure, which they know is their enemy.

SP: What about American troops? Isn’t their presence helping?

Chief Zazai: The local tribes cannot stand against these extremist elements because they have got no support from the American forces and the Kabul government. [The warlord] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is no stranger to the Afghan conflicts; he is a player and has deep roots all over the world. His main agenda now is to continue fighting the U.S. and NATO.

SP: This brings us back around to your formation, this summer, of a Tribal Police Force of eighty men in your valley. Can you work with American forces? Do you think such local forces can make a difference?

Chief Zazai: My commander (Amir Mohammed) and my team met with the U.S. 10th Mountain Division commander in Ali Khell and explained the aim of the force. The 10th Mountain Division’s commander was overjoyed to know we will be working in partnership and simply looking after each other’s backs. The U.S. 10th Mountain Division commander is a great guy … I have been in touch via e-mails and have provided him with some intelligence about some very nasty elements that are based in my Valley and their networks and supporters.

SP: How do you envision working with U.S. forces? Will you be sharing intelligence? Going on joint patrols? Would you welcome a 24-hour U.S. presence in your villages?

Chief Zazai: Absolutely. The main aim of this program is to collect accurate and good intel and be able to share those and then make plans to attack the hideouts of these elements, pinpointing them jointly [to] prevent collateral damage and the loss of innocent lives. I and my tribes do not have any problem with U.S. forces being in our Valley as our guests and we will treat them as guests and not invaders. As I have mentioned to you earlier, these insurgents (Taliban, AQ and other groups such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s men) are getting safe refuge with the tribes within the villages, towns and in the provinces. But if we are able to get the complete support of the tribes, we can turn this grass root level force against these groups. The Tribes will fight them in the villages, in towns & in the mountains. At this time and stage, there are other regional powers who play smart and to an extent they are winning. The US & NATO should not always use their muscles, they have got to use their brains as well and take the time to study this nation, its rich culture and give respect to its warrior tradition.

SP: What would you hope the U.S. would do as an immediate next step in your valley?

Chief Zazai: The U.S. should take charge now, step in and sign treaties with the tribes directly without any middlemen (I am sure Alexander the Great would have done it in the same fashion.) Once the treaty is signed (thumb-printed) by the chiefs and elders, they are honor-bound to do what they have agreed to.

SP: Chief Zazai, you have indicated how dangerous the anti-tribal elements are. In your valley alone, we know they have already, just a couple of weeks ago, tried to attack Amir Mohammed and your Tribal Police with an IED planted in a mosque. How realistic is it that the tribes can stand up to these elements?

Chief Zazai: If all the people of my Valley (or in general the Afghan people) were 100% siding with the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami or al-Qaeda, then the formation of our Tribal Police Force would have been a dream. Over 2000 individuals have registered to take part in our TPF program. If the [local] people were all pro-Taliban, we could not have recruited even twenty!

As the history of Afghanistan is a witness, when the Tribes have gone against a power, they have defeated that power, but when they have sided with a power, they enabled it to rule and expand. The Afghan tribes are loyal, dedicated people; they have never stabbed anyone in the back, when they join hands with a friend that’s for life until the friend betrayed them. [If] the tribes living in one province will sign Unity treaties among each other … this could be expanded to the neighboring provinces as well. I have done so in my Valley with the eleven tribes. It’s a small-scale achievement but it could be applied all over and enlarged.

[To be continued next week with more about the warlords, their relation to the Taliban and to the Karzai government; also further conversation on the grass-roots movement that Chief Zazai envisions and is working for to strengthen Afghan- and tribal-centric governance from the ground up.

[Also don't miss our ongoing Monday/Tuesday series, "One Tribe At A Time," by Special Forces Major Jim Gant.  Maj. Gant's vision of a light-footprint "tribal engagement" strategy coincidentally mirrors Chief Zazai's—only from the point of view of the U.S. military.  Maj. Gant is a Silver Star winner who has served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.]

Chief Zazai, right, with his father, Chief Raiss Afzal Khan Zazi and his bodyguard, both murdered in 2000

[The blog is out of town this week.  Here is a re-boot of our first post in this ongoing series. See you Monday!]

This will be the first of a multi-part conversation with Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai of Paktia province, Afghanistan. Let’s plunge right in.

SP: Chief Zazai, this summer you were elected to the paramountcy of eleven tribes in your home region in Paktia province along the border with Pakistan. Why did the tribes meet at this time? What was their agenda?

Chief Zazai: On July 17th, 2009, my 11 tribes, their Chiefs and Tribal elders gathered in the Zazi valley, where the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division is also based. The event was broadcast for three days by the TV channel “Shamasad” and was seen throughout Afghanistan. The tribes met to address the problems created by the escalation of the insurgency and of course the failure of the Karzai administration to bring a stable, uncorrupt and people-representing government to Afghanistan.

SP: Prior to this meeting, you had established a tribal police force. Can you tell us why you did this and what has happened since?

Chief Zazai: At the end of May 2009, the tribal council, after many meetings, created this force to protect the people of the valley and to provide security for the council members. Our Zazi force is constituted of 80 men, who are governed by the tribal council. They serve full-time; they are armed with their own weapons and commanded by my friend Amir Mohammed. Commander Amir fought against the Soviets in the 80s and has been the commander of the border police appointed by the interior minister. He is a brave commander and a man of his word.

On September 13, just a few days ago, I was having a dinner with my family when I received a phone call from Commander Amir, who informed me of an IED placed in the mosque where he and the Tribal Police were having a dinner. It was Ramadan and they had been fasting all day so they came together to break their fast. An explosive device went off, blowing up part of the mosque and injuring a few tribal police. Thank God somehow the main bomb did not go off. If it had, it could have killed 30 to 40 people easily. Just imagine if this bomb had gone off and killed this many people! Could I have been in the position to form another such group? No, never.

Site of the 11 Tribes' Meeting, Paktia province

SP: Who planted the bomb and why?

Chief Zazai: The reason the insurgents planted this bomb is that they are aware we are siding with the US.

SP: Your own father was assassinated, I understand, under orders from Mullah Omar. You yourself have survived two attempts on your life. Can you tell us about your father and what you and he are fighting for?

Chief Zazai: My father was Chief Raiss Afzal Khan Zazai; he was murdered in 2000. My father led our Zazi tribes in the fight against the Soviets and later he organized the Tribal Chiefs from three provinces (Paktia, Paktika & Khost) in order to upraise against the Taliban. Some ex-commanders were visiting him at our family home and there they carried out this heinous crime. I have not found who gave the orders yet but the motive behind this was to bring a full stop to this movement and also to frighten the rest.

My father was one of our country’s first industrialists. He and my uncle founded the first Afghan transport company, Mrastay Transport, using old British Bedford trucks. His company, Wazir Ltd, exported raisins, dried fruits and Afghan carpets to Russia, Germany and Britain, while importing vehicles, appliances and medicines.

My father believed that the tribes were the past and future of Afghanistan. Let me show you a letter he wrote before he was killed (and several years before 9/11) to our dear friend David Simpson in England, who had fought alongside my father against the Soviets and is writing a book about this and much more. I thank David for his kind permission to excerpt this.

Besides the full support of Pushtoon tribes, I’ve the full support of Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Turkmen Tribes. I successfully expanded the “Zazi Tribes Union” to national tribal union where all the major tribes in Afghanistan are included. The present situation in my country is very bad.  People are suffering terribly under the unlawful regime of the Taliban … In 1995 I warned you of Taliban’s agenda towards extremism and [predicted] the present situation. I hate to say this but “I told you so.” Dear Dave, I need [the outside world's] support. My tribesmen are ready. Our Tribal main issue is to completely finish drugs and end the deep roots of terrorism.

SP: Is this your cause too, Chief Zazai?

Chief Zazai: Yes! The difficulty is in making people understand, people of America and the West. Afghanistan seems so complicated and confusing. It is complicated even to us! But, Steve, I tell you it is possible to bring together the tribes, which are the true power on the ground in Afghanistan and from there build a stable structure of governance. I said before that the gathering of the eleven Zazi tribes was broadcast for three days. A momentum is now circulating around Afghanistan for a tribal united front which could find a way forward. My team in Kabul and Zazi have been contacted by many Tribal chiefs who wish to join our efforts in uniting all the Afghan tribes.

Inside the tent: elders from the 11 tribes

SP: I want to talk more about issues that (you’re right) are confusing to non-Afghans: who’s who … the Taliban, the warlords, al-Qaeda, the insurgency. And about how your tribal union might work with the US military, what you’re doing, what the American responses have been, what’s possible. Are you game to keep going?

Chief Zazi: I will talk as long as you want, if we can get even a few people to listen.

[To be continued next Friday.  Monday, we'll start serializing Special Forces Major Jim Gant's white paper, "One Tribe At A Time."]

Three items will be coming up this week (and in the following weeks) in this space that I think will be extremely interesting and provocative. I can say that with confidence because none of them will be coming from me.

First, in the next day or two, we’ll post a response from Michael McClellan to George Will’s recent “This Week” comments and Washington Post column. Mike is an extremely thoughtful and articulate young lawyer and Lincoln Fellow at the Claremont Institute. I don’t know what he’ll say but I’m really looking forward to seeing it.

Second, I’m very excited to use this space as a platform for a white paper titled “One Tribe At A Time — A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan” by Special Forces Major Jim Gant. If you’ve followed this blog, you’ve seen Maj. Gant’s name a number of times. He’s an ODA team leader, recipient of the Silver Star, with three combat tours in Iraq and two in Afghanistan–on his way back for a fourth tour in Iraq in about a month.

Major Gant is not a pundit or a think-tanker; he’s a warrior whose points of view derive from time on the ground, in the villages and under fire, and whose ideas come from real experience that has really worked. In a nutshell his thesis is that, if the U.S. hopes to succeed in Afghanistan, it must work with the tribes. There’s no other way. The good news is that he believes this can be done–in a light-footprint way, without massive additional troop deployments and without egregious casualty counts (though it will take specially-trained, motivated and supported Tribal Engagement Teams). In his paper, Major Gant lays out the specifics for how he believes this can be done. What makes his recommendations carry weight, in my view, is that he is speaking from real-world experience. The course he proposes, he and his team have lived out. It has worked. Whether you agree or not, this is going to be fascinating reading.

Third, I’m hoping to provide a forum for an Afghan tribal chief, just elected to the paramountcy of eleven tribes in his home valley. This gentleman (who I won’t name for the moment, out of respect for him, and also because this announcement may be a bit premature) is knowledgeable in a way that no Westerner can be and is extremely articulate and passionate in championing the tribal cause in Afghanistan. He has survived two attempts on his life–and that’s the least of his personal story.

Like Major Gant, the chief believes that the tribes are the only avenue by which Afghanistan can truly achieve stability, autonomy and evolve to a state from which the forces of global jihad can be neutralized or eliminated. He has very specific ideas and propositions and he too has lived them out in the real world.

I’m hoping to run a number of stories on these issues, primarily in the words of these individuals. One thing they have in common is a belief that it would be a mistake for the U.S. to disengage from Afghanistan at this time. What is needed, they say, is not so much more American involvement as smarter involvement.

I don’t know specifically what any of these gentlemen are going to say, but I’m sure it’s going to make for some really interesting debate.